Competition and Contestability in Central and Eastern European Banking Markets by Yildirim, H. Semih
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School
5-2003
Competition and Contestability in Central and
Eastern European Banking Markets
H. Semih Yildirim
University of Tennessee - Knoxville
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more
information, please contact trace@utk.edu.
Recommended Citation
Yildirim, H. Semih, "Competition and Contestability in Central and Eastern European Banking Markets. " PhD diss., University of
Tennessee, 2003.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/2351
To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by H. Semih Yildirim entitled "Competition and
Contestability in Central and Eastern European Banking Markets." I have examined the final electronic
copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Business Administration.
George C. Philippatos, Major Professor
We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:
Ronald E. Shrieves, M. Cary Collins, Hui Chang
Accepted for the Council:
Dixie L. Thompson
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)
 
 
 
To the Graduate Council: 
 
I am submitting herewith a thesis written by H. Semih Yildirim entitled “Competition and 
Contestability in Central and Eastern European Banking Markets”. I have examined the 
final electronic copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be 
accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 
with a major in Business Administration. 
 
 
George C. Philippatos  
Major Professor 
 
 
 
We have read this thesis 
and recommend its acceptance: 
 
Ronald E. Shrieves  
 
  
M. Cary Collins    
 
 
Hui Chang     
 
 
 
 
Accepted for the Council: 
 
Anne Mayhew                                         
Vice Provost and 
Dean of The Graduate Studies 
 
 
 
(Original signatures are on file with official students records.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMPETITION AND CONTESTABLITY IN CENTRAL AND 
EASTERN EUROPEAN BANKING MARKETS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation  
Presented for the  
Doctor of Philosophy Degree  
The University of Tennessee,  
Knoxville, Tennessee 
 
 
 
 
H. Semih Yildirim  
May 2003
 ii
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2003 by H. Semih Yildirim  
All rights reserved  
 
 
 
 
 iii
 
 
 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 
This dissertation is gratefully dedicated to my parents for instilling in me the 
values of hard work, a good attitude and persistence, and for stressing the value of 
education. Their love, concern and pride in my work were always a major source of 
strength to me. This dissertation is also dedicated to my beloved wife, Melahat, for 
always giving me the inspiration to set high goals and the confidence to achieve them. 
Without her encouragement, support and personal sacrifices I could not have done it. 
 iv
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I gratefully acknowledge the advice and support of my dissertation committee, 
George C. Philippatos, Ronald Shrieves, M. Cary Collins, and Hui Chang.  Their 
teaching and encouragement are ultimately responsible for this dissertation. I owe a 
special debt to George C. Philippatos, whose guidance has stimulated my research in 
countless ways and whose friendship is yet more valuable. I wish to express my sincere 
appreciation and thanks to all faculty members, colleagues, and staff in the Finance 
Department for their academic and professional support and friendship. I thank the 
University of Tennessee, College of Business Administration, and the SARIF Foundation 
for financial support. 
 
 
 
 v
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study attempts to analyze the effects of financial liberalization and 
deregulation on competitive conditions in the banking industries of fourteen Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) transition economies using firm-level data for the period 1993-
2000. The basis for the evaluation of competitive situation is the extant oligopoly theory 
in the new industrial organization literature, specifically, the competition model 
developed by Rosse and Panzar (1977), and Panzar and Rosse (1982,1987). This 
approach relies on the premise that, in their long-run equilibrium, banks will employ 
different pricing strategies in response to a change in input costs depending on the market 
structure in which they operate. 
 
The results of the competition analysis suggest that the banking markets of CEE 
countries cannot be characterized by the bipolar cases of either perfect competition or 
monopoly over 1993-2000 except for FYR of Macedonia and Slovakia.  That is, banks 
earned their revenues as if operating under conditions of monopolistic competition in that 
period. Overall, large banks in transition countries operate in a relatively more 
competitive environment compared to small banks, or in other words, competition is 
lower in local markets compared to national and international markets. Finally, the cross-
sectional analysis of competitive structure shows initially a decreasing trend between 
1993 and 1996 and a subsequent increasing trend in competitive conditions after 1996.  
 
Having determined the degree of competition, this study further examines the 
relationship between competition, concentration and bank performance. The result of the 
empirical analysis does not yield any significant relationship between competition and 
concentration, suggesting the possibility that higher contestability, in part due to the 
recent technological advances, have resulted in an overall increase in competition, despite 
high level of market concentration.  Furthermore, I find that the average bank deviates 
substantially from the best-practice frontier. The managerial inefficiencies in CEE 
banking markets were found to be significant, with average cost efficiency levels of  72 
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and 76 percent by the "Distribution-free Analysis" (DFA) and the "Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis" (SFA).  These average estimates suggest that an average bank would have 
incurred 28 to 24 percent less of its actual costs had it matched its performance with the 
best-practiced bank. The alternative profit efficiency levels are found to be significantly 
lower relative to cost efficiency. According to SFA, approximately one-third of banks’ 
profits are lost to inefficiency, and almost one-half according to the DFA.  
 
In explaining the cross-sectional determinants of efficiency, the results suggest 
that higher efficiency levels are associated with larger banks, higher profitability and 
better capitalization. Banks that heavily rely on core deposits in funding their assets are 
found to be more efficient. Consistent with most prior research, higher level of problem 
loans is associated with lower efficiency levels. Regarding the effect of market structure 
on bank performance, the level of competition is found to increase efficiency while 
market concentration is negatively linked to efficiency. Finally, foreign banks operating 
in transition countries are found to be more cost efficient but less profit efficient relative 
to domestically owned private banks and state-owned banks. 
 
Overall, findings of competition analyses are consistent with previous research on 
competitive conditions in the banking industries of developed countries that generally 
report varying degrees of monopolistic competition.  The notion that high concentration 
in CEE banking markets will result in monopoly rents as suggested by SCP paradigm is 
not supported by empirical results. These results seem to be compatible with contestable 
markets theory (CMT), if one can assume that incumbent firms set their prices close to 
the competitive level because of potential competition; otherwise higher prices will 
attract potential entrants with hit-and-run strategies. These results are also consistent with 
the expectation that liberalization and deregulation of CEE financial markets have 
increased the competitive conditions in CEE banking markets. 
 
Recommendations for transition strategies for government efforts in designing 
and implementing transition program are provided as well as avenues for future research.  
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER                   PAGE 
1. INTRODUCTION …………………………………………………..……... 1 
  
1.1. Overview ……………………………………………..…………………. 1 
1.2. Policy Implications of the Research ……………………………………... 4 
  
1.3. Summary of the Empirical Findings……………………………………… 5 
  
1.4. Organization of the Dissertation ……………………………………..….. 7 
2. BACKGROUND ON THE CEE BANKING ……………………………… 8 
  
2.1. Initial Conditions ……………………………………………………….... 8 
    
2.2. Summary of the progress of Banking Supervision ……………………….. 11 
  
2.3. Privatization, Foreign Entry and Concentration  …………………………. 12 
  
2.4. Effects of EMU and Future of CEE Banking ……………..…………….. 14 
2.5. Summary  …………………………………………………………………. 17 
3. THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW …………………………..……. 19 
3.1. Financial Liberalization and Deregulation Framework ………..………… 19 
3.2. Major Approaches to Competitive Behavior……….…………..………… 24 
3.2.1. Structural Models …………………………………………………. 24 
3.2.1.1.The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) Paradigm …...…… 25 
3.2.1.2.Efficient Structure Hypothesis (ESH)……….………………… 29 
3.2.2. Non-Structural Models……………………………………………. 31 
3.2.2.1.Contestable Markets Theory (CMT) …………………………. 32 
3.2.2.2.The Panzar-Rosse Methodology and Empirical Literature……   33 
 viii
CHAPTER                   PAGE 
4. EMPIRICAL MODEL, TESTABLE HYPOTHESES, AND DATABASE 39 
4.1. Empirical Model and Testable Hypotheses……………………………… 40 
4.2. Discussion of the Variables……………….…………………………..….. 44 
4.3. Database and Sample Selection …………………………………….……. 46 
5. EMPIRICALTEST RESULTS  ..…………………….………………..…… 49 
5.1. Equilibrium Test …………………………………………………………. 49 
5.2. Competitive Structure Tests ……………………………….……………. 50 
5.2.1. Estimation for the Overall Sample ……………………..………… 51 
5.2.2. Estimation for the Individual Countries ……………..…………… 55 
5.3. Competition, Concentration, and Bank Performance .................................. 56 
5.3.1 Competition and Concentration ………………………………………56 
5.3.2. Competition and Bank Performance ………...………………………58 
5.3.2.1.Cost and Profit Efficiency Measures……………………… 59 
5.3.2.2. Explaining Measures of  Efficiency ................................    61 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS …….…………………………………. 66 
6.1. Summary of the Empirical Findings and Limitations of the Research…...   67 
6.2. Policy Implications of the Results ……………………………….……… 70 
6.3. Avenues for Future Research  …………………………………………… 72 
LIST OF REFERENCES ………………………………….…………………… 74 
APPENDIX..…………..……………………………..…………………………… 81 
VITA……………………………………………………………………………… 122 
 ix
LIST OF TABLES 
 
TABLE                         PAGE 
 
 
2.1 Banking Supervision in Central and Eastern Europe................................... 82 
2.2    Foreign Bank Ownership in Selected CEE Countries .................................. 83 
2.3    3-Bank Concentration Ratios for CEE Banking Industry ........................... 84 
2.4    Balance Sheets for CEE Banks (1999) ......................................................... 85 
2.5    Selected Financial ratios for CEE Banks (1999).......................................... 86 
3.1    Interpretation of H statistic .......................................................................... 87 
3.2 Summary of Literature on Measuring Bank Competition Using P-R   
Methodology  ............................................................................................... 88 
4.1    Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables ……...…… 89  
4.2    Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables for Individual Countries ..... 90 
4.3    Number of Banks By Country and Year (1993-2000)  ................................ 94 
4.4    Descriptive Statistics of  Banks in Sample by Country Average for 1999.... 95 
5.1 Equilibrium test for CEE Banking Market for Individual Years and the  
Period  1993-2000 ....................................................................................... 96 
5.2    Regression Results of Competitive Conditions for CEE banks: Panel Data 
Covering the Period  1993-2000  ................................................................. 97 
 
5.3    Empirical Results from Model 1a 1993-2000 (Fixed and Random effects).. 98 
5.4    H-Statistics for Years and Size Groups ........................................................ 99 
5.5    H-Statistics for Individual Countries 1993-2000 ........................................ 100 
5.6   Empirical Results for the Czech Republic .................................................. 101 
5.7  Empirical Results for Estonia  .................................................................... 102 
5.8  Empirical Results for Croatia ...................................................................... 103 
 x
5.9  Empirical Results for Hungary .................................................................... 104 
5.10  Empirical Results for Lithuania ................................................................... 105 
5.11  Empirical Results for Latvia  ....................................................................... 106 
5.12  Empirical Results for FYR of Macedonia ................................................... 107 
5.13  Empirical Results for Poland  ...................................................................... 108 
5.14  Empirical Results for Romania .................................................................... 109 
5.15  Empirical Results for The Russian Federation  ........................................... 110 
5.16  Empirical Results for Slovenia .................................................................... 111 
5.17  Empirical Results for Slovakia .................................................................... 112 
5.18  Empirical Results for Yugoslavia  ................................................................ 113  
5.19  Empirical Results for Bulgaria ..................................................................... 114 
5.20 3-Bank Concentration Ratios and Competition Index  (1993-2000) ........... 115 
5.21 Derivation of  the Cost Frontier ................................................................... 116 
5.22  Derivation of  the Alternative Profit Frontier  ............................................ 117 
5.23 The Multi-product Translog Functional Form ............................................. 118 
5.24 Cost Efficiency Measures ............................................................................ 119 
5.25 Profit Efficiency Measures ........................................................................... 120 
5.26 Regression Analysis of Potential Correlates of Efficiency ........................... 121 
 
 1
 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have gone through a significant 
economic and political transformation during the last decade.1 As they moved away from 
state control to a relatively free-market system, these countries launched wide-ranging 
economic and financial reform programs to stabilize their economies and to establish 
market forces as performance drivers. These reform programs typically entailed the 
liberalization of product and financial markets, and restructuring and privatization of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to open their markets to global competition. Throughout 
the transition, the strengthening and restructuring of the financial sectors, as well as 
improving the supervision and regulation of banking and financial services, received a 
strong emphasis to cope with market forces and sustain economic stability and growth.2  
Privatization of state-owned banks and elimination of the restrictions on domestic and 
foreign market entries increased the number of commercial banks operating in their 
previously concentrated and inefficient national markets, and changed the competitive 
conditions in banking profoundly.  
                                                 
1 See Scholtens (2000) for a survey of the efforts for developing financial systems in CEE countries during 
the early transition years (1990-1996). 
2 For the positive role that the financial system and financial institutions play in economic development see, 
among others, Pagano (1993), King and Levine (1993a,b), Levine (1997), Levine and Zervos (1998), and 
Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
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While the command economies of Europe were experiencing this transformation 
to market economies, their western counterparts were marching toward the goal of 
European political and economic integration. The establishment of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as an optimum currency area constituted a giant 
step towards this latter goal.3 As the process of achieving full integration among its 
member countries is evolving, the European Union (EU) is currently working on an 
eastward enlargement through the inclusion of former socialist countries from Central 
and Eastern Europe into the union.  Indeed, in March 1998 the EU formally launched the 
process that will make enlargement possible by initiating membership negotiations with 
ten applicant CEE countries. While the CEE countries expressed their wishes for 
inclusion into the union, they also acknowledged that membership in the EU implies a 
long-term commitment to the inevitable process of a complete financial and economic 
integration.  
Such developments are expected to have a substantial influence on the financial 
and banking systems of member countries, particularly those transition economies of 
CEE with increasingly tighter links to the EU. Even before this phase, widespread 
deregulation and liberalization, accompanied by technological development and 
internationalization have significantly changed the competitive structure of the European 
financial services industry. After the implementation of the Second Banking 
Coordination Directive in 1993, banks from the EU countries were allowed to branch 
                                                 
3 The goal of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is set out in the Treaty on European Union, signed at 
Maastricht in February 1992. Briefly, EMU involves the creation of a single currency, the euro, to replace 
the national currencies of the EU Member States participating in it. The euro is managed by the European 
Central Bank.  
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freely into other EU-member countries.4 The new legislation, by exposing national 
banking markets to potential new entrants, and making cross-border acquisitions and 
mergers practically free of all remaining obstacles, resulted in intensified competition and 
substantial banking and financial industry restructuring in Europe. These new 
competitive conditions are likely to entice large European financial institutions that are 
currently operating at relatively low margins to extend their cross-border operations into 
the potentially more profitable markets of CEE countries.  
Based on the above discussion, I wish to evaluate the effects of recent changes in 
the competitive structure of the CEE banking markets and to measure the current level of 
market contestability attained by the recent liberalization and deregulation process. 
Specifically, I would like to know whether the recent legal and institutional reforms were 
sufficient to transform the market structure into a more competitive mode or whether 
there are still some serious obstacles inherited from the prior system that prevent the 
realization of competition regardless of recent liberalization and deregulation efforts.  
In the present study, I employ the theory and concepts of the new industrial organization 
literature for analyzing and measuring the banking competition in fourteen European 
transition economies. To the best of my knowledge, there are no prior comprehensive 
empirical analyses of changing competitive conditions in the CEE banking industry. 
Hence, this study tries to fill this gap and extend previous studies on competition in 
European banking to the CEE banking markets using the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic [Rosse 
and Panzar (1977), Panzar and Rosse (1982,1987)].  
                                                 
4 The Second Banking Coordination Directive defines the basic conditions for the provision of the so-called 
Single Banking License.  
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1.2 Policy Implications of the Research 
 
The results of this study will likely have important policy implications since the 
research focuses on the essential structural and regulatory aspects of banking which 
enable CEE countries to promote financial stability during the transition period and to 
create an efficient financial infrastructure focused on accession to the European Union. 
Since their money and capital markets are still in infancy, the transition countries have 
primarily bank-based financial systems; banks intermediate large portions of capital 
flows and household savings, and constitute the primary source of business financing. 
This situation implies that a potential breakdown in their banking systems can yield 
contagion effects to all other sectors of their economies.  Indeed, these transformation 
challenges, give rise to some of the following policy questions for the CEE economies: 
(1) As they open their economies to a greater influence from the western world, how 
should they manage the transition process by avoiding financial distress and adjust 
successfully to the expected new competitive environment caused by increased domestic 
and foreign participation in their local banking markets? (2) How should they design and 
implement the competitive policies, and appropriate supervisory and regulatory 
framework? (3) Should they enforce market discipline by promoting foreign competition, 
rather than adapting defensive policies to protect the existing infant-banking industry 
from competition? (4) How successful have the transition economies been in 
implementing the regulatory reforms and industry restructuring to establish more 
competitive and efficient banking sectors? (5) Should they shift the focus to development 
of their capital markets, in order to make the final transition from “bank-based” to 
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“capital market-based” financial systems? These are some of the important policy 
directions to be developed by CEE countries for the successful development of stable, 
efficient, properly supervised financial systems for both the transitional economic 
reforms and their preparations for accession to the European Union.  
The aforementioned policy implications, as well as increasing interest in this topic 
among academics and practitioners alike, motivate my examination of competition and 
contestability in the CEE transition economies. Given the challenges that the CEE 
countries face, the conclusions of this study should be timely and helpful for 
policymakers to better understand how their decisions affect the market conduct and 
performance of financial institutions under their supervision. 
 
1.3 Summary of the Empirical Findings  
The results of the competition analysis suggest that the banking markets of CEE 
countries cannot be characterized by the bipolar cases of either perfect competition or 
monopoly over 1993-2000 except for FYR of Macedonia and Slovakia.  That is, banks 
earned their revenues as if operating under conditions of monopolistic competition in that 
period. Overall, large banks in transition countries operate in a relatively more 
competitive environment compared to small banks, or in other words, competition is 
lower in local markets compared to national and international markets. Finally, the cross-
sectional analysis of competitive structure shows initially a decreasing trend between 
1993 and 1996 and a subsequent increasing trend in competitive conditions after 1996, 
revealing the impact of liberalization on competitive conditions.  These conclusions hold 
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under a variety of specifications controlling for bank-size, risk and various deposit 
composition characteristics, and a number of estimation techniques. These results are 
consistent with previous research on competitive conditions in the banking industries of 
developed countries that generally report varying degrees of monopolistic competition. 
Having determined the degree of competition, this study further examines the 
relationship between competition, concentration, and bank performance. The result of the 
empirical analysis does not yield any significant relationship between competition and 
concentration, suggesting the possibility that higher contestability, in part due to the 
recent technological advances, have resulted in an overall increase in competition, despite 
high level of market concentration. Furthermore, I find that the average bank deviates 
substantially from the best-practice frontier. The managerial inefficiencies in CEE 
banking markets were found to be significant, with average cost efficiency levels of 72 
and 76 percent by DFA and SFA.  Overall, these average estimates suggest that an 
average bank would have incurred 28 to 24 percent less of its actual costs had it matched 
its performance with the best-practiced bank. The alternative profit efficiency levels are 
found to be significantly lower relative to cost efficiency. According to SFA, 
approximately one-third of banks’ profits are lost to inefficiency, and almost one-half 
according to the DFA.  
In explaining the cross-sectional determinants of efficiency the results suggest 
that higher efficiency levels are associated with large banks, higher profitability and 
equity. Banks that heavily rely on core deposits in funding their assets are found to be 
more efficient. Consistent with most prior research, higher level of problem loans is 
associated with lower efficiency levels. Regarding the effect of market structure on bank 
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performance, the level of competition is found to increase efficiency while market 
concentration is negatively linked to efficiency. Finally, foreign banks operating in 
transition countries are found to be more cost efficient but less profit efficient relative to 
domestically owned private banks and state-owned banks. 
 
Overall, findings of competition analyses are consistent with previous research on 
competitive conditions in the banking industries of developed countries that generally 
report varying degrees of monopolistic competition.  The notion that high concentration 
in CEE banking markets will result in monopoly rents as suggested by structure-conduct-
performance (SCP) paradigm is not supported by empirical results. These results seem to 
be compatible with contestable markets theory (CMT), if one can assume that incumbent 
firms set their prices close to the competitive level because of potential competition; 
otherwise higher prices will attract potential entrants with hit-and-run strategies. These 
results are also consistent with the expectation that liberalization and deregulation of CEE 
financial markets have increased the competitive conditions in CEE banking markets. 
 
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation 
The next Chapter sets the stage for the analysis by reviewing briefly the recent 
history of banking reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. Chapter 3 summarizes the 
previous studies and methods employed to test competition in the banking literature. 
Chapter 4 presents the model, the testable hypotheses, and the data used to assess 
competitive conduct in CEE banking markets. Chapter 5 discusses the empirical results. 
Finally, Chapter 6 presents the conclusions and outlines suggestions for future research.
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Chapter 2 
Background on the CEE Banking  
 
This chapter provides information on the banking sectors in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The Chapter is divided into four sections. First, background on the initial 
conditions when transition started during the late 1980s is provided in section 2.1. This is 
followed by the summary of progress made on banking regulation and supervision in 
section 2.2. Section 2.3 discusses the effects of privatization, foreign entry, and market 
concentration. Finally, section 2.4 discusses the possible effects of the EMU on CEE 
banking and the future of banking in transition countries.     
 
2.1 Initial Conditions 
 
Until the social and economic transformation reforms in the late 1980s, a socialist 
banking system was in effect in CEE countries. At the center of this structure was a 
monobank that performed the simultaneous roles of central bank and commercial bank. 
The monobank was in charge of issuing currency, managing the payments system among 
enterprises, providing savings deposit facilities to households, making loans to 
enterprises and covering the deficits of the State budget (Catte and Mastropasqua, 1993). 
In some of these countries, in addition to the monobank, there also existed a Savings 
Bank and a Foreign Trade Bank. The former functioned as the primary channel in 
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intermediation of household savings while the latter specialized in foreign exchange 
transactions of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and in managing their foreign debts and 
assets (Thorne, 1993). These banks, however, had neither expertise nor control over the 
process of assessing and managing risk and return, and the granting of loans, since 
lending decisions were then made centrally by the state, which typically allocated funds 
based on political priorities rather than efficiency and profitability considerations.    
The restructuring of the banking system in CEE economies started in the late 
1980s after the collapse of their Communist regimes. Hungary and Poland took the lead 
in establishing independent central banks, followed by the three Baltic States (Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania) and the Czech and Slovak Republics. The monobank system was 
transformed into a two-tier banking system by breaking up the monobank into a central 
bank and a number of commercial banks in each country by new regulatory frameworks.5 
New commercial banks were allowed to engage in a wide range of banking activities, 
usually specializing in sectors, with increased role in management and credit allocation. 
Since the new banking system was established based on administrative decisions rather 
than market forces and without paying much attention to the effective and efficient 
functioning of the system, the newly created banks were relatively large and inefficient. 
Furthermore, due to the lack of competitive pressures, the banking sector had little 
incentive to pursue efficient behavior. These artificially established banks inherited many 
problems from central planning that plagued the banking system: the capital inadequacy, 
non-performing loans to SOEs, non-diversified loan portfolios and clientele, 
                                                 
5 Some of the assets of the Monobank were transferred to newly established commercial banks without 
cleansing the non-performing loans and many of these banks were technically insolvent from the date of 
their establishment. 
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inexperienced management and personnel, underdeveloped branch networks, and other 
related problems.6  
During the initial years of transition, restrictions on the establishment of new 
banks were relaxed and some governments also encouraged the establishment of new 
banks as a way of enhancing competition. These years were characterized by a growing 
number of commercial banks and efforts to strengthen the two-tier system. Although the 
rapid growth of commercial banks brought a certain degree of competition to the banking 
sectors, many of these new banks soon became financially distressed and were declared 
insolvent. Governments accelerated the restructuring efforts with the introduction of 
schemes for revamping their banking systems.7 While restructuring their banking 
systems, most of these countries suffered severe banking crises due both to corporate 
distress and the absence of effective regulatory and legal environments. Ineffective 
corporate governance and payments discipline intensified the problems. The bank 
administrators and managerial personnel lacked the knowledge and experience of 
banking procedures, as well as the technology practiced in market economies; 
additionally the customers were not accustomed to the new banking practices. Thus, the 
banking sectors did not have sufficient flexibility to operate adequately or competitively 
in a market economy. Commercial banks experienced dramatic deteriorations on their 
balance sheets due to large stocks of non-performing loans and capital inadequacy.8  
                                                 
6 Talley et al. (1998) Specifically mention four key market-supporting institutions that are not yet fully developed 
in the CEE countries: (1) Adequate accounting and auditing, (2) Efficient legal frameworks, (3) Effective 
corporate governance, and (4) Strong bank supervision. 
7 For example, Hungary has adopted the Anglo-Saxon model of separation between the commercial and 
investment banking functions, while the Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania have followed the 
German-Japanese models of universal banking.  (Thorne 1993) 
8 In Hungary and the Czech Republic, banks have been forced to write-off some of their bad loans, while in 
Poland they have been encouraged to work-out problem loans in their portfolios (Brada and Kutan, 1998).   
 11
2.2 Summary of The Progress in Banking Supervision 
Despite the problems outlined in the previous section, the CEE governments 
appeared determined to develop competitive and efficient financial systems based on 
market forces for the conversion from central planning to market economies and for 
fulfilling the obligations for future EMU integration. Table 2.1 presents a summary of the 
progress of banking supervision in selected CEE transition countries by the year 1996 
(All tables are located in the appendix). As discussed in Scholtens (2000), the CEE 
countries followed broadly a similar path in developing their supervisory structure in 
banking. All countries allow for universal banking but some restrictions exist in Bulgaria 
and Hungary. Supervision of the banking system is carried on by central banks except for 
Hungary and Slovenia where some supervisory authorities work jointly with the central 
bank in conducting this task.  The capital requirements for banks range from $0.1 to $15 
million in Hungary depending on the type of bank, and this requirement is the highest in 
the Czech and Slovak Republics, followed by Hungary.  As for capital adequacy, all 
countries seem to comply with the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
recommendation to keep the required minimum risk-weighted capital/assets ratio of 8 
percent. Banks are required to make provision for loan losses. Concentration of credit is 
limited to 15% to 25% of bank capital and participation in the non-banking sector is 
allowed to a certain extent.  Except for Latvia, all countries either have designed deposit 
insurance systems or are in the process of setting them up to protect depositors from 
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losses due to bank failures.9 The last two rows of Table 2.1 demonstrate the progress of 
reform programs in banking and securities markets. The numbers reveal that, on average, 
transition countries placed relatively more emphasis on banking market reforms than 
capital market reforms. This is, of course, one of the weaknesses in the structural reforms 
that has persisted through the decade of the 1990s, leaving the transition economies with 
bank-based financial systems.  
 
2.3 Privatization, Foreign Entry, and Concentration  
CEE governments initiated large-scale privatization programs that substantially 
diminished the state ownership in banking during the mid-1990s. The main motive 
behind privatization of state-owned banks was the desire to enhance competition and 
efficiency in the banking sector through increased foreign and domestic competition.  
Banking crises that affected the region during this period have basically accelerated the 
privatization process and thus, foreign participation. By the end of the decade, the share 
of foreign ownership in terms of both total assets and capital was exceeding 60 percent, 
making the CEE banking sector the most open emerging market to foreign participation. 
As shown on Table 2.2, among the three most developed CEE countries, Hungary 
took first place in the internationalization process with approximately 60 percent foreign 
ownership of banking assets and about 80 percent foreign control in the domestic banking 
                                                 
9 However the maximum amount of deposits covered by the insurance is not comparable to that of   US and  
European banks. (The Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) in the U.S. insures deposits in commercial banks and 
savings banks up to a maximum of $100,000 per account, and the comparable figure is $23,000 within the 
EU). 
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industry in 1999. Hungary is followed by Poland with about 53 percent of total 
commercial bank assets controlled by foreign institutions. Also, the Czech republic 
privatized three of the four large state owned banks after 1998, and by the end of 1999 
foreign participation in the banking system reached 47 percent. 
Despite large-scale privatization and more liberal public policy towards the 
elimination of entry barriers, the banking sector remained highly concentrated throughout 
the sample period. Table 2.3 lists the 3-Bank concentration ratio (CR3) in the sample for 
the CEE countries from 1993 to 1999. For the pooled sample CR3 went down from 80.5 
% in 1993 to 59% in 1997, and subsequently rose to 65% in 1999. Nevertheless, the 
largest three banks in Estonia, Lithuania, and Yugoslavia held more than 90% of the 
assets in the banking industry in 1999. Over the sample period, on average, Russia had 
the lowest CR3 ratio of about 49%, followed by Poland and Hungary with CR3 ratio of 
about 52 %. Although I do not report the 5-bank concentration ratios here, they are 
substantially higher than the comparable ratios for the UK and the US. (Cetorelli and 
Ganbera, 2001, Table 1).   
The banks in the region are relatively small in terms of asset size compared to 
banks in the Western countries. Table 2.4 reports average country balance sheets for all 
banks for the year 1999. The average asset size for the overall sample is $1.08 billion of 
which loans constitute from 28 % (in Romania) to 55 % (in Slovakia).  According to 
BankScope world ranking, only 5 CEE banks are listed in the top 1000-bank list. Various 
average countrywide financial ratios for 1999 are presented in Table 2.5. During the early 
years of transition, the majority of the banks in the region were burdened by substantial 
 14
amounts of non-performing assets. However, after enacting and implementing the new 
prudential regulations to stabilize the banking system, and bailing out of bad loans by 
governments, banks experienced a significant balance sheet restructuring and 
improvements in asset quality. According to various asset quality proxies in 1999, except 
for the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, banking sectors in CEE countries seem to attain a 
viable level of asset quality.  But I should note that these asset quality ratios are not quite 
comparable to those in Western European countries where a ratio of non-performing 
loans to gross loans of more than 5% is considered as a serious problem for a given bank. 
Table 2.5 shows that more than one-third of the gross loans in the Czech banks turns out 
to be non-performing in 1999. Despite the banking crises experienced and problems 
associated with transition, all countries appear to achieve a viable level of capital 
adequacy, as reflected in their capital to asset ratios, which typically range from 8.6 % 
(Slovenia) to 29.7 % (FYR of Macedonia). 
 
2.4 Effects of EMU and Future of CEE Banking   
The establishment of EMU is expected to have a substantial influence on the 
financial and banking systems of member countries and on the transition economies of 
CEE countries with increasingly tighter links to EU. The introduction of the single 
currency and monetary policy among participating nations in 1999 seems to have 
accelerated the structural changes by fostering mergers and acquisitions and the 
integration both intra-countries and across borders through elimination of previous 
implicit barriers arising from national currencies.  
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As noted by Yeyati and Struzenegger (2000), "even before EMU, the 
globalization of financial markets, aided by a gradual process of deregulation, have been 
fueling a rapid rationalization of European banking systems, with increased competition 
from within the region and the threat from ever bigger US financial powerhouses forcing 
European intermediaries to consolidate and extend operations to other previously 
untapped, markets."  An integrated financial system and common monetary policy are 
expected to accelerate this trend. Prati and Schinasi (1997) note that, after a substantial 
consolidation and restructuring process triggered by the introduction of the euro, the 
wholesale market will be dominated by the largest and strongest European Universal 
banks that are likely to face intense competition from U.S. investment banks and U.K. 
merchant banks in international operations.  The authors further note that although 
competition in retail banking is not expected to be that strong, elimination of barriers on 
cross-border provision of banking services and increased public demand in retail services 
may open retail banking to competition from large European banks and can lead to a 
further rationalization process.  
With regard to banking activities, the most direct and instant effect of the single 
currency will be on the foreign exchange trading since cost of currency conversions and 
the risk of cross country positions will eventually vanish. It is estimated that, introduction 
of euro will cause a 10% to 15% reduction in intra-European foreign exchange activity.10  
The revenue derived from derivatives and currency-hedging activities will also be 
significantly diminished due to elimination of speculative and/or hedging motives for 
                                                 
10 This estimate was given by Helmut Schiber, member of the Directorate of the Deutsche Bundesbank in  
November 1998 at a speech on the Impact of EMU on the banking structure in Europe.  
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currency. Similarly, equalization of interest rates across member countries will reduce, if 
not eliminate, interest rate hedging activities by banks and lead to a decline in real rates. 
Reduced interest margins, however, are likely to increase money and securities market 
activities of banks to recover lost revenues from foreign exchange trading and 
investments. Therefore, the introduction of euro will favor the establishment of deep and 
liquid integrated money and capital markets that will increase competition among the 
financial institutions.   
These new competitive conditions are likely to put more pressure on European 
banks to extend their cross-border operations into more profitable markets of CEE 
countries. It is widely acknowledged that, foreign entry to the banking sector influences 
the behavior of domestic banks by boosting the competitive conditions. A number of 
strategies should have been implemented to gradually adapt the new conditions and 
become viable in anticipation of deregulation and increased competition. It is expected 
that banks will respond to increased competition by extending the scope of professional 
services beyond traditional markets, generating other revenue sources through offering 
new services and products, focusing on non-interest income-generating activities, 
reducing excess capacity through mergers and/or branch closure, and updating their 
operations through  new technology. It is conceivable that, as a result of the elimination 
of regulatory barriers to foreign entry, the banking industries of CEE countries will 
gradually move to nearly full internationalization. The establishment of European 
integration will accelerate this process. The increased competitive pressure from large 
international banks  is likely to foster the rationalization of CEE banking sectors and 
improve the efficiency  levels in the long run;  however it may affect negatively market 
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stability in the short run. Therefore the countries in the region can experience some bank 
failures in addition to mergers and acquisitions during this rationalization process.   
 
2.5. Summary  
Over the last decade the banking markets in the transition economies of Central 
and Eastern Europe have gradually evolved from the traditional monobank system of the 
central planning period to a western-style, geographically and sectorally diversified, two-
tiered system of today. The governments, with financial and strategic support of 
international organizations, spent enormous amounts of effort in undertaking 
comprehensive political and economic reform programs to develop a competitive and 
efficient banking system, based on market forces, for the transformation from central 
planning to market economies and for converging toward the criteria for European 
integration.  New financial markets, institutions and channels of intermediation have been 
established from scratch.  
The banking system in CEE countries was highly concentrated and, at least until 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, was tightly regulated and protected from foreign 
competition. The governments have recognized the need to carry out a transformation of 
their banking infrastructure almost simultaneously with political and economic changes. 
During the course of transition, the CEE countries have shown significant progress in 
integrating with the developed economies of the EU. Although the rate of transformation 
to a market economy system varies significantly from one country to another, the specific 
steps that CEE countries have taken to transform their banking system for the market 
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economy are broadly similar. The immediate emphasis of banking sectors in the region is 
to match their counterparts in West Europe by creating efficient, competitive and 
profitable banks with well-developed infrastructure and wide range of activities.  The 
development in banking industry standards in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and 
Estonia are expected to attain Western Standards in the near future.  Currently, 10 CEE 
countries, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia are negotiating their potential accession to 
the EU. They are trying to increase the transparency of their economic policymaking and 
financial institutions, by adopting internationally accepted standards that will smooth 
their transition into the European Union.  
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Chapter 3 
Theory and Literature Review 
This chapter provides a brief review of the relevant literature. The chapter is 
divided into two major sections. Section 3.1 provides the background on financial 
liberalization and deregulation, and its effects in emerging banking markets. Section 3.2 
review major empirical approaches to competitive behavior and summarizes the relevant 
literature.  
 
3.1 Financial Liberalization and Deregulation Framework 
Competition is widely accepted as a positive phenomenon for most industries, and 
this is also true for banking markets. Moreover, financial liberalization in developing and 
transition countries is generally considered as the most important way to promote 
competition. Financial liberalization can be achieved in three different forms: Capital 
account liberalization entails the elimination of capital controls and restrictions on the 
convertibility of the national currency. Deregulation of financial markets reduces the role 
of government in the domestic financial system and removes the government control on 
lending and borrowing rates, and credit allocation, thereby allowing market forces to 
function effectively. Internationalization of financial services ensures equal treatment 
between domestic and foreign financial institutions and eliminates the obstacles for cross-
border business activities.   
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As noted by Casu and Molyneux (2000), European banking systems until mid-
1980s were typically characterized by relatively high levels of government controls and 
restrictions that inhibited competition and maintained a protected banking environment. 
The main objective of the many governments was to enhance the stability of the banking 
industry by preserving national ownership of the largest domestic banks. The employed 
instruments by governments that limited competitive conduct in the banking industry 
included (i) structural elements such as the functional separations of institutions (e.g. 
commercial and investment banking), (ii) entry requirements and discriminatory rules 
regarding foreign banks and investors, (iii) direct restrictions on assets and liabilities 
(including prudential rules and rules on participations in non-banking firms),  (iv) rules 
related to information disclosure, credit ceilings, limitations on branching and the 
determination of fees commissions and rates on assets and liabilities (Neven and Roller, 
1999). 
In order to facilitate the needs of increased international trade of goods and 
financial services, many banking institutions have become international in recent years. 
This internationalization trend has helped the liberalization of financial markets around 
the globe. As a result of significant progress in information technology, financial 
innovation led the banks to provide a much broader package of services in a more 
liberalized environment. The banks not only had to compete in their traditional 
businesses but also faced the increased competitive pressure coming from emerging non-
bank institutions. Banking liberalization during the 1980s eliminated the restrictions on 
the way banks conducted businesses, and thus significantly affected their competitive 
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conduct. Increased competition among banks and other financial intermediaries reduced 
profit margins especially for wholesale and corporate banking. It is expected that these 
competitive pressures arising from financial service liberalization will  enhance the cross-
border activities within and between EU countries and CEE countries. 
The effects of financial liberalization and deregulation were dramatic on the 
transition economies of Europe.  During the early years of transition excessive 
concentration, preferential treatment by governments, and limited entry significantly  
impeded the progress of banking industry.  As a result of liberalization and deregulation, 
CEE banking markets experienced substantial structural changes in the form of large-
scale privatization and increased foreign participation.  The proportion of local bank 
assets controlled by foreign-owned institutions has significantly increased from 8% in 
1994 to 56% in 1999, making their banking systems widely open to foreign participation. 
This recent increase in foreign ownership in CEE banking markets suggests that the 
authorities in these countries supported foreign participation as a policy to improve the 
competition, efficiency, and stability of the banking system.  
Although the literature clearly suggests that increased foreign participation as a 
result of financial liberalization improves competitiveness and efficiency of banking 
systems, there is no consensus on whether a greater foreign participation enhances 
financial system stability and capital flow process in emerging countries. The recent 
growing presence of foreign-owned financial institutions raised a number of important 
policy issues related to the effects of liberalization on banking system stability. On the 
one hand, proponents of liberalization suggest that foreign entrants can help countries 
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build more robust and efficient banking system and provide a better resource allocation 
by introducing international practices and standards.11  With respect to deregulation, 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) propose the elimination of market entry restrictions 
in developing countries that show typically excess demand for credit, and they conjecture 
that new entry is likely to lower the costs of funds, raising the availability of credit, 
leading to more investment. Levine (1996, pp.236-237) specifically mentions that 
liberalizing foreign bank entry may  (i) improve access to international capital markets, 
(ii) improve the quality, pricing and availability of financial services through stimulating 
competition and contestability, and introducing more modern banking skills, management 
techniques, and technology in the domestic markets, and  (iii) serve to stimulate the 
development of financial policy and infrastructure by intensifying pressures for 
governments to improve the legal, regulatory, and supervisory systems.  
On the other hand, the internationalization of financial services raised a number of 
legitimate concerns among researchers and policy makers. Among these concerns are the 
collapses of domestic financial service firms and of domestic financial systems through 
capital outflow, the undermining of prudential controls, and the loss of monetary 
autonomy.  Some policymakers and researchers argue that entry by foreign firms can lead 
to substantial decline in profits, potentially leading to excess risk-taking and financial 
distress among domestic firms, especially in countries where the financial system is 
undercapitalized. The experience of severe problems in the banking systems of a number 
of developing, transition and industrialized countries after deregulation and liberalization 
                                                 
11 See Levine (1996), Walter and Gray (1983), Gelb and  Sagari (1990). 
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during the last two decade, has led some to blame liberalization as the sources of such 
problems.12 Therefore, there is no consensus on the effects of liberalization on financial 
system development and stability in transition countries.  However, prudential 
supervision by the authorities and increased financial strength of the foreign banks in the 
local markets are likely to contribute to financial system stability. 
The effect of liberalization and deregulation on domestic banking industry has 
been examined for different countries in numerous studies. Several empirical studies 
produced some systematic evidence suggesting that liberalizing of foreign entry to the 
banking sector will enhance the efficiency of domestic banks and provide better resource 
allocation. McFadden (1994) reports improvements in domestic bank operations after 
foreign bank participation in Australia.  Bhattacharaya (1993) reports individual cases in 
Pakistan, Turkey, and Korea, where foreign banks helped to access foreign capital 
accessible to finance domestic projects. Examining 80 countries in the 1988-1995 period, 
Claessens et al.  (2001) find that entry of foreign banks reduces the profitability and the 
overall expenses of domestic banks. Likewise, Terrell (1986) compares the banking 
markets in 14 developed countries for 1976 and 1977, and finds lower gross interest 
margins, lower pre-tax profits, and lower operating costs for eight countries that allow 
foreign bank entry. After investigating the competitive effects of relaxation of entry 
barriers to the Uruguayan banking industry Gelfand and Spiller (1984) and Spiller and 
Favaro (1987) conclude that strategic interactions across banks and across different 
markets decreased after the regulatory reform. Ribon and Yosha (1999) focus on the 
                                                 
12 E.g. Argentine and Chile in the early 1980s, the United States savings and loan crises in late 1980s, 
Estonia 1992-1994, Nordic Countries late 1980s - early 1990s.   
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Israeli banking industry, finding a significant improvement in competition in the years 
following financial liberalization.  
As mentioned before, the main objective of this study is to evaluate the effects of 
recent financial liberalization and deregulation on competitive conduct and bank 
efficiency. In light of the above discussion and empirical evidence provided by prior 
research, it can be clearly proposed that, by eliminating the restrictions on the way banks 
conducted businesses, removing substantial entry barriers and exposing national banking 
markets to potential new entrants, financial liberalization and deregulation have 
significantly increased the competition and efficiency in CEE countries. The next section 
discusses several methods employed in previous research to test competition in the 
banking industry.  
 
3.2 Major Approaches to Competitive Behavior 
In the banking literature, there are two major empirical approaches for assessing 
competition: (a) The structural approach and (b) The non-structural approach. In this 
section I review several important competition models under both approaches and 
summarize the empirical findings of the relevant studies. 
3.2.1. Structural Models  
The "structural approach" to modeling competition embraces the structure-
conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm and the efficient structure hypothesis (ESH). The 
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SCP paradigm assumes that banking firms' market power increases with industrial 
concentration and thus establishes a direct link from industry structure to competitive 
conduct. A rise in concentration is regarded as increasing collusive opportunities between 
banks, and hence would lead to higher prices and profitability.    
Efficient structure hypothesis (ESH) advocated by Demsetz (1983) and Peltzman 
(1977) challenges the SCP paradigm. ESH interprets the positive relationship between 
profitability and market concentration in a different way. It asserts that the causality 
between performance and concentration is reverse: some firm-specific factors such as use 
of latest technology or superior management cause firms become profitable and grow 
large, leading to market concentration.  
 
3.2.1.1 The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm  
The SCP paradigm, originally developed by Mason (1939) and Bain (1951), 
posits a one-way casual relationship from industry structure to firm conduct, and from 
firm conduct to industry performance, therefore try to infer the degree of competition of 
an industry from its structural features. Market structure usually refers to industry 
concentration, market shares of firms, the extent of product differentiation, and regulatory 
or other barriers for new firms to enter the industry. Under the SCP framework, market 
structure determines firm or industry conduct, and conduct, in turn, determines firm and 
industry performance, which typically is measured by profits or price-cost margins. In 
this approach industry performance and concentration are often measured by some form 
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of profit ratio and by a concentration ratio, say 5-firm concentration ratio, CR5. A typical 
SCP equation can be written as:  
πi = α + βCR5i + ΣkγkXki + εi,  i=1,2,……,n      (3.1) 
where πi is usually an accounting measure of profitability  X is a vector of exogenous 
variables that affect profitability or price-cost margin, and i is the index for industry or 
firm. Positive coefficient on the concentration measure is considered to justify the SCP 
paradigm, implying that concentrated markets provide the banks with the opportunities to 
earn monopolistic profits through their ability to offer lower deposit rates and charge 
higher loan rates.  
This model implicitly assumes that in a concentrated industry all firms can easily 
raise their prices and that their profit rates in the industry can be protected by the entry 
barriers. Therefore it is more likely to see firms engage in anticompetitive conduct in 
highly concentrated markets where only few and large firms prevail. It is also assumed 
that all firms within an industry have the same profit rates, so that the profit rate of the 
industry can serve as a good measure of industry performance.  
The results of the empirical studies examining the linkage between market 
concentration and market power in the US banking industry are mixed. For example, 
Berger and Hannan (1989) analyze a cross-section of the U.S. banking markets in 1983-
85, by modeling bank deposits as a function of local concentration indices. After 
controlling for various factors affecting price-setting behavior, the authors find evidence 
that deposit rates are significantly lower in the most concentrated markets, in favor of 
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SCP hypothesis. More specifically they report that banks in the most concentrated 
markets use their market power to extract rents by paying 25 to 100 basis points less on 
their deposits than banks operating in the least concentrated markets. Hannan and Berger 
(1991) compare the deposit interest rate with the benchmark money market rate, which is 
not controlled by banks. They find evidence of market power implied by higher level of 
deposit rate rigidity in markets with higher HHIs.13 Hannan and Liang (1993) also present 
evidence in favor of more market power in concentrated deposits markets. However, 
Calem and Carlino (1991) find contradictory evidence. They report non-competitive 
conduct in money market and 3- and 6-month CD markets but deviations from 
competitive pricing were uncorrelated with market concentration. In a similar work 
focusing on deposit rate rigidity, Jackson (1997) finds a non-monotonic relation between 
market concentration and market power demonstrated by increasing price rigidity in both 
high and low levels of concentration. This U-shaped relationship between market 
concentration and market power is not consistent with SCP paradigm. Berger (1995) 
examines the price-concentration relationship, after controlling for efficiency, and finds 
evidence supporting SCP paradigm in deposit markets, but not in loan markets.  
Gilbert (1984) presents a fairly comprehensive review of the related early 
literature concerning the US retail banking markets over a period from 1964 to 1983, 
testing the hypothesis of a positive correlation between concentration in the banking 
                                                 
13 HHI stands for Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration (HHI), sum of the squared market shares 
of all firms in the market and range from zero to 10,000. For example, if the market is characterized as 
monopoly with one bank having a 100percent market share,  then HHI equals (100)2 =10,000.  
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markets and bank performance. The overall evidence is ambiguous. About 50% of the 
studies confirm the hypothesis, but in any case variation in the market concentration has 
only a small impact on the performance measure employed. Gilbert strongly criticizes the 
fact that most of the market structure studies neglect the effect of rate regulation on bank 
performance, which suppress the true relationship between market structure and 
performance.  
In SCP type of studies a common problem is the definition of market. It is very 
difficult to identify the true geographic markets, which determines the measured level of 
concentration and the multi-product structure of banking industry further deepens this 
problem (Shaffer, 1992). Another criticism for SCP studies is that they cannot distinguish 
between market power and efficiency as a source of concentration and profitability 
(Demsetz, 1973; Peltzman, 1977). According to Clarke and Davies (1982), profitability 
and market structure are actually jointly determined by other factors involving the 
production technology and demand for the product.  After controlling for some aspects of 
efficiency, Berger (1995) finds that the relation between concentration and profitability 
significantly declines. Evanoff and Fortier (1988) also find some linkage between profit 
and concentration for markets characterized by substantial entry barriers, after controlling 
for efficiency. In summary, these studies do not totally rule out concentration as a 
contributing factor to monopoly power, but they conclude that it is hard to obtain 
significant and definitive conclusions from the studies that employ SCP paradigm.  
Empirical studies that utilize SCP paradigm to assess the competitive conditions 
in European banking markets are relatively scarce. Among those  are Molyneux and 
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Thornton (1992), Bourke (1989), Molyneux and Teppet (1993), and Molyneux (1993).  
Molyneux and Thornton (1992) investigate the determinants of bank performance across 
12 European countries between 1986 and 1989, and find a positive and significant, but 
very small correlation between the 10-bank correlation ratio, CR10 (with respect to total 
assets), and pretax return on assets. Bourke (1989) uses the three-bank concentration 
ratio, CR3, and pre-tax profit measures for 12 North-American and European  countries 
with Australia included over a ten year period from 1972 to 1981. His results are closely 
in agreement with Molyneux and Thornton's findings. According to his findings, banks' 
interest rate spread increased with the Herfindahl index only in small banking markets 
with relatively few competitors and high entry barriers. Molyneux and Teppet (1993) 
examine 5 EFTA countries (Sweden, Norway, Finland, Austria, and Switzerland) and 
find support for the SCP hypothesis.  Finally Molyneux (1993) obtains weak support in 
favor of the SCP over the efficient structure hypothesis in the major European banking 
markets.  
 
3.2.1.2 Efficient Structure Hypothesis 
This approach contends that a positive relationship between profits and 
concentration stems not from market power but from the greater efficiency of firms with 
larger market shares. In other words, more efficient firms gain larger market shares, 
resulting in higher levels of concentration. According to ESH, highly efficient banks (due 
to firm specific factors such as technological or managerial skills, etc.) can pursue two 
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different strategies. They can maximize their profits by maintaining the present levels of 
prices and firm size or by reducing prices and expanding firm size (Lloyd-Williams et al., 
1994). If the efficient banks opt for expansion, they will increase their market share at the 
expense of other relatively inefficient firms and thus bank efficiency will be the leading 
force for high market concentration. The efficiency structure hypothesis, therefore,  
implies that the causal link will be between market share, a measure of firm's efficiency, 
and profits, but there will be no causal relationship between market concentration and 
profitability (Denizer, 1997).  Following Weiss (1974) and Smirlock (1985) we can 
formulate a test for ESH by estimating the following profit equation.  
π = α0  + α1 CR + α2  MS+ βMSCR + ΣδiXi       (3.2) 
where : 
π is a profit measure, CR is the concentration measure of the market structure, MS is a 
market share measure, MSCR is the interaction of market share and concentration, and 
X is a vector of exogenous variables that account for firm-specific (e.g. risk, size, cost) 
and market-specific (e.g.  commercial, investment) characteristics.    
  A coefficient combination of α1 = 0 and α2 > 0 implies that larger market 
shares are associated with more efficient firms and this superior efficiency is the source 
of rents reflected in higher profitability while also indicating that higher market 
concentration is not the source of monopoly rents. Conversely, a coefficient combination 
of  α1 > 0 and α2 = 0 implies that it is not market share which creates monopoly rent 
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reflected in higher profitability but rather market concentration.  Thus, SCP hypothesis is 
verified by α1  > 0 and α2 = 0, and ESH is verified by α1 = 0 and α2 > 0. 
 Efficient structure hypothesis (ESH) is applied to the banking industry by 
Smirlock (1985), Smirlock and Brown (1986), Brozen (1982), Evanoff and Fortier 
(1988), Berger and Humphrey (1991), and Molyneux (1995).  Smirlock (1985) finds a 
positive relationship between market share and profitability, and no linkage between 
concentration and profitability. He concludes that his results support the efficient 
structure hypothesis. Brozen (1982) and Evanoff and Fortier (1988) report similar 
conclusions. However, Smirlock's conclusion is questioned by Shepherd (1986) and 
Rhoades (1985) for his assumption that market share can be considered as a proxy for 
efficiency. They maintain that market share represents market power rather than a 
measure of efficiency.  
 
3.2.2 Non-Structural Models 
"Non-structural models" suggest an alternative approach to competitive behavior. 
These models do not infer the competitive conduct of banks through the analysis of 
market structure, but rather recognize that banks behave differently depending on the 
market structure in which they operate. The basic tenet of these models concerning 
competitive conditions is that there is no clear evidence that the use of market power 
would be greater in more concentrated industries. 
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3.2.2.1 Contestable Markets Theory  
Under the non-structural framework, the “Contestable Markets Theory” (CMT), 
developed by Baumol (1982), argues that a concentrated banking industry can behave 
competitively if the barriers for new entrants to the market are low. The theory argues 
that the threat of potential entry forces banks with large market shares to price their 
products competitively under certain conditions.  
CMT assumes that firms can enter or leave rapidly any market without losing 
their capital and that potential competitors have the same cost function as incumbent 
firms. Baumol emphasizes that incumbent firms are always vulnerable to hit-and-run 
entry when they try to exercise their potential market power. These features of 
contestable markets imply that a concentrated banking market can be effectively 
competitive even if it is dominated by a handful of large banks.  Nathan and Neave, 
(1989) suggest that "if contestability theory is plausible, then widely expressed concerns 
about the domination of a country's financial system by some type of financial 
intermediaries may be valid only to the extent that financial markets are not contestable". 
Therefore, policymakers should be relatively less concerned about the market dominance 
of some type of financial intermediaries in a country’s financial system, if the financial 
markets are contestable. Based on these arguments, deregulation and liberalization will 
make the banking industry more contestable or open to competition.  In order to test for 
contestability, previous research employed the competition model proposed by Rosse and 
Panzar (1977) and Panzar and Rosse (1982,1987) or the so-called “H statistic”.  
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3.2.2.2 The Panzar-Rosse Methodology and Empirical Literature 
The Panzar-Rosse approach for testing market power relies on the premise that 
banks will employ different pricing strategies in response to a change in input costs 
depending on the market structure in which they operate. This conjecture, therefore, 
implies that whether a bank operates in a competitive market or exercises some 
monopoly power can be inferred from the analysis of that bank’s total revenue as it 
responds to changing input prices. Unlike the SCP paradigm or EMH, the PR 
methodology analyzes directly the competitive conduct of banks based on the 
comparative static properties of the reduced form revenue equations, without employing 
any structural measures.  
In order to measure the competitive structure of the industry and the market 
power of banks, Panzar and Rosse established a so-called "H statistic"; this is estimated 
as the sum of the elasticities of the reduced form (equilibrium) revenues with respect to 
input prices. More specifically, the H statistic measures the percentage change in a bank's 
equilibrium revenues caused by one percent change in all of the bank's input prices. 
Panzar and Rosse show that the H statistic can be used to infer competitive structure of 
the industry in which the bank operates by demonstrating the positive relationship 
between the H statistic and industry competitiveness. The authors further show that not 
just the sign of the H statistic is important but its magnitude as well.  As noted in Bikker 
and Haaf  (2000, p.4) this approach assumes that (a) banks are operating in their long run 
equilibrium; (b) the performance of the banks is influenced by the actions of other market 
participants; (c) cost is linearly homogenous in input prices, so that a one percent increase 
 34
in input prices will increase costs by one percent for all output levels; and (d) the price 
elasticity of demand is greater than unity. By not requiring a locational market definition 
a priori, PR framework avoids the potential bias caused by the misspecification of market 
boundaries; hence the H statistic will reflect the average of the bank' s conduct in each 
market for a bank that operates in more than one market. 
In order to assess the industry structure and market power of firms Panzar and 
Rosse start their analysis with the estimation of reduced form revenue equations. The 
total revenue is observable even when the price and quantity are not. To obtain the 
equilibrium output and the equilibrium number of banks, profits are maximized both at 
the firm and industry level. This implies firstly that the profits of bank i is maximized 
where marginal revenue equals marginal cost:  
 R'i (Yi , n, Zi ) - C'i (Yi , Wi , Ti) = 0,        (3.7) 
where R'i represents marginal revenue of bank i, C'i is marginal cost,  Yi is the bank 
output, n is the number of banks, Zi is the vector of exogenous variables that shift the 
bank's revenue function,  Wi , is the vector of  input prices, Ti  is the vector of exogenous 
variables that shift the bank's cost function.  Furthermore, it also implies that in 
equilibrium the following equality holds for all the firms in industry: 
Ri* (Y* , n*, Z* ) - Ci* (Y* , W , T) = 0  ∀ i,    i=1,…..,n*   (3.8) 
where "*" represents equilibrium values. Under the PR framework the market power is 
reflected by a change in the equilibrium revenue of a bank (dRi*) with respect to a 
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change in input prices (dwki.) Panzar and Rosse define a measure of competition, the H-
statistic as the sum of the elasticities of the reduced-form revenues with respect to all 
input prices:14  
∑
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H statistic quantifies the responsiveness of total revenue to a proportional increase 
in all input prices.  
The economic interpretation of the H statistic is as follows. If the market in which 
banks operate is characterized as monopoly then H statistic is less than or equal to zero. 
This is due to the economic intuition that a monopolist's revenue will respond in the 
opposite direction to a change in input prices, as a one percent increase in input prices 
leads to a one percent increase in marginal and average costs (since they are 
homogeneous of degree one in input prices), thus reducing equilibrium output and 
revenue. Panzar and Rosse further show that the H statistic is also negative when the 
structure is a perfectly colluding oligopoly or a conjectural variations short-run oligopoly.  
The H statistic is equal to one when the market structure is characterized as 
perfectly competitive in long-run equilibrium; under this condition, a proportional shift in 
all input prices will increase both marginal and average costs by the same proportion, 
without changing the equilibrium output of banks.  In order to survive the competition, 
                                                 
14 See Panzar and Rosse (1987), Bresnahan (1989, pp.1034-1039) and Vesala (1995) for details of the 
formal derivation of the H statistic. 
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banks will be forced to increase prices (e.g. interest rates on loans) until they cover the 
increased costs. During this adjustment process, the inefficient banks might be acquired 
by efficient ones or be eventually driven out of the market by competition. The reduction 
in the number of banks in the industry will increase the demand faced by each incumbent 
bank, thereby leading to a rise in the output price and revenue by the same amount as 
costs.  Shafer (1982) shows that the H statistic is also unity for a natural monopoly 
operating in a perfectly contestable market and also for a sales-maximizing firm that is 
subject to breakeven constraints. 
As the third case, Panzar and Rosse distinguish the situation of monopolistic 
competition, in which, although banks behave like monopolists, the market entry or exit 
of other banks that offer imperfect rival products makes them always generate precisely 
zero profits. In this case the H statistic will lie between zero and unity, as revenues will 
increase less than proportionally to changes in input prices 
As mentioned earlier, a critical feature of the H statistic is that the tests must be 
undertaken on observations that are in long-run equilibrium. The empirical test for 
equilibrium is suggested by the fact that competitive capital markets will equalize risk-
adjusted rates of return across banks, such that in equilibrium, rates of return should not 
be correlated statistically with input prices. If the markets under examination are not in 
equilibrium,  a decline or increase in factor prices will cause a temporary decline or 
increase in the rate of return (Molyneux et al. 1994). To test for equilibrium, the H 
statistic is calculated with the return on assets (or equity) replacing bank revenues as the 
dependent variable in the regression equation. A finding that H<0 would indicate 
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disequilibrium, whereas H=0 would indicate equilibrium. Different interpretations of the 
H-statistic are summarized in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.2 summarizes the previous studies that have examined the competitive 
structure of the banking industry in various countries by using H-statistic. Shaffer (1982) 
applied the PR methodology to a cross-section of banking firms in New York in 1979, 
and found that competitive conduct of banks cannot be characterized as monopolistic or 
perfectly competitive in the long run equilibrium. Similarly, Nathan and Neave (1989) 
also rejected the hypothesis of monopoly and perfect competition for Canadian banks, 
trust companies and mortgage companies over the period 1982-1984. Molyneux et al. 
(1994) used the same analysis in a sample of German, UK, French, Italian, and Spanish 
banks for each year of the period 1986 to 1989. On average, their results suggest 
monopolistic competition in Germany, France, Spain and the UK, and monopoly in Italy. 
Vesala (1995) applied a similar model to the Finnish banking industry and found 
monopolistic competition for 1985-88 and 1991-92, and perfect competition for 1989-90. 
Molyneux et al. (1996) examined the competitive conduct of Japanese commercial banks 
and found monopoly for 1986 and monopolistic competition for 1988. Coccorese (1998), 
Rime (1999), and Hondroyiannis et al. (1999) found monopolistic competition for Italian, 
Swiss, and Greek banking sectors. In a more recent study, De Bandt and Davis (2000) 
reported monopolistic competition for large banks and monopoly for small banks for 
Germany and France, and monopolistic competition for small and large banks in Italy 
over the period 1992-1996. Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) found monopolistic 
competition of varying degrees for EU countries for the period of 1989 to 1996. Finally, 
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in a more comprehensive study, Bikker and Haaf (2000) examined competitive conduct 
of banks in 23 developed countries over the time period 1988-1999.  They reported that, 
in general, the banking markets of industrialized countries could be characterized by 
monopolistic competition. However, they could not reject the case of monopoly for the 
samples of small banks in Australia and Greece, and perfect competition for large banks 
in several countries.  
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Chapter 4 
Empirical Model, Testable Hypotheses and Database 
 
Based on the discussion in earlier chapters, the objective of this study is to 
evaluate the effects of recent changes in competitive structure in the CEE banking 
industry and to show how close is such banking industry to the state of high competition 
envisioned by recent legal and institutional reforms. The basis for the evaluation of 
competitive situation is the competition model developed by Rosse and Panzar (1977), 
and  Panzar and Rosse (1982,1987).  It should be noted that, although banks can 
somehow differentiate themselves through specialization in certain areas and through the 
provision of new services, the PR approach can not capture the degree of competition in 
each division of banking markets separately; it is basically a means of estimating the 
overall competitive conduct in a given banking system. In order to apply the PR 
methodology to the banking industry I follow the previous studies and adopt the 
"intermediation approach" to bank modeling where the financial intermediation role of a 
bank is emphasized.15  It also reflects the realities of banking in the CEE countries, as 
they attempt to cross the threshold to modern banking.  
                                                 
15 Two empirical approaches to modeling bank output are the "intermediation" and the "production" 
approaches. The intermediation approach treats banks as financial intermediaries that create output only in 
terms of their assets, using their liabilities, labor and capital. Deposits are treated as inputs that are 
intermediated into banks’ outputs (loans and investments) and interest on deposits is a component of total 
cost, together with labor and capital costs.  The production approach, views banks as firms that use capital 
and labor to produce loans and deposits.  Since deposits are considered as output, the interest expense on 
deposits is not included in the costs. For further discussion of these approaches, see Berger et al. (1987)  
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4.1 Empirical Model and Testable Hypotheses 
I estimate the following bank revenue equation in which revenue is explained by 
factor prices and other bank-specific variables that affect long-run equilibrium bank 
revenues for CEE countries for the years 1993 through 2000.  
 
ln (REVit) = h1 ln(PFit) + h2 ln(PLit) + h3 ln(PKit)  + β1 ln(TAit)  + β2  ln(EQTYit)  
  + β3  ln(LOANit)  + β4 ln(IBDPit) + l
L
l
l D∑
=1
α + εit    (4.1)  
 
for t=1,…..,T where T is the number of periods observed, and i=1,….. ,I, where I is the 
total number of banks and ln is the natural logarithm.  The dependent variable (REV) is 
the ratio of total interest revenue (or total revenue) to total assets. The model posits that 
banks use three input factors- namely, deposits, labor, and physical capital. Variables PF, 
PL and PK are the unit prices of these inputs or reasonable proxies: (PF) the ratio of 
interest expenses to deposits and other liabilities, (PL) the ratio of personnel expenses to 
total assets, and (PK) the ratio of non-interest expenses to fixed assets.16  A number of 
control variables included to account for size, risk, and deposit mix differences are 
similar to those used in previous studies. These factors are total assets (TA), financial 
capital (EQTY), net loans (LOAN), and interbank deposits (IBDP). To take the country-
                                                 
16 Ideally, the ratio of personnel expense to the number of full time employees would be a better proxy for 
labor cost. Due to the unavailability of data on the number of employees I cannot employ the ratio of 
personnel expenses to number of workers as unit price for labor. Using the ratio of personnel expense to 
total assets as labor cost is a common approach in studies that employ BankScope data. [Molyneux et al. 
(1994), Bikker and Groeneveld (1999), De Bandt and Davis (2000)]   
 
 41
specific characteristics into account, country dummy variables were also added in the 
pooled sample estimations.  
The 3-input factor model with total interest revenue (INTREV) as the dependent 
variable will be referred to as Model 1a and the model with total revenue (TOTREV) as 
the dependent variable will be referred to as Model 1b. The definitions of the dependent 
and explanatory variables for the model as well as their descriptive statistics for the 
overall sample are presented in Table 4.1. The same descriptive statistics for individual 
countries are provided in Table 4.2. Under the PR framework, the H statistic is equal to 
the sum of the elasticities of the interest revenue with respect to the three input prices: 
 H =  h1 + h2 + h3          (4.2)  
For almost all the banks in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and for several banks in other 
CEE countries, BankScope data do not provide personnel expense figures as a separate 
cost item. To rectify this problem a second model is specified, as shown in equation (4.3), 
where the sum of personnel expense and capital expense variables are combined into the 
total overhead expense variable.  
 
ln (REVit) = h1 ln(PFit) + h2 ln(POit) + β1 ln(TAit)  + β2  ln(EQTYit)  
+ β3  ln(LOANit)  + β4 ln(IBDPit) + l
L
l
l D∑
=1
α + εit                      (4.3)   
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where  PO is the ratio of overhead expenses to total assets and other variables are the 
same as those in equation (4.1).  This 2-input factor model with total interest revenue 
(INTREV) as the dependent variable will be referred to as Model 2a and the model with 
total revenue (TOTREV) as the dependent variable will be referred to as Model 2b. The 
H-statistic by Model 2 is thus given by the sum of the two input elasticities:17  
 
H = h1 + h2          (4.4) 
The conventional wisdom about the banking market structure of CEE countries is 
that banks are relatively large and industries are very concentrated. Monopolistic 
competition is therefore a priori the most plausible structure for the banking industry 
since it "recognizes the existence of product differentiation and is consistent with the 
observation that banks tend to differ with respect to various product quality variables and 
advertising, although their core business is fairly homogenous" (Bikker and Haaf, 2000, 
p.5). The testable hypothesis for monopolistic competition is then, given in (4.5). 
 
0 < H=h1 + h2 + h3 < 1,        (4.5)  
 
where H ≤ 0 is monopoly and H=1 is perfect competition.   
                                                 
17 This new specification helped us to recoup a substantial amount of observations lost due to the 
unavailability of complete data for personnel expense variable in two countries.   
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As noted earlier, one critical assumption of the PR approach is that banks operate 
in their long-run equilibrium phases, thus implying that their returns should not be 
statistically correlated with input prices.  For the long-run equilibrium test, I follow the 
extant literature by running the original regression equation with return on average assets 
(ratio of net income to average total assets) being the new dependent variable, as shown 
in Equation (4.6). A value of H = 0 would indicate an equilibrium in the banking markets 
under investigation.18 
 
ln (ROAit) = h1 ln(PFit) + h2 ln(PLit) + h3 ln(PKit)  + β1 ln(TAit)  + β2  ln(EQTYit)  
  + β3  ln(LOANit)  + β4 ln(IBDPit) + l
L
l
l D∑
=1
α + εit    (4.6)  
 
Although previous studies generally report cross sectional results, this study 
employed both cross-section and time series analyses in empirical estimation of 
Equations 4.1 and 4.3.  The regression models are first estimated by the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) method on the pooled sample of banks and years, implicitly assuming that 
standard errors are independently distributed across banks and over time.  One advantage 
of having panel data is that it allows controlling for heterogeneity bias, or the 
confounding effects of omitted variables that are stable over time. Considering the time-
series dimension of the data, I also used both fixed and random effects estimators, 
correcting for the effect of any combination of time-invariant variables that have been 
                                                 
18 Shaffer (1985) notes that if the sample is not in equilibrium, it is true that H<0 no longer verify 
monopoly, but it is still true that H>0 disproves monopoly or conjectural variation short-run oligopoly.  
 44
omitted, knowingly or not, from the regression model. The fixed-effect estimation entails 
specifying a different intercept term for each bank in the sample as well as time dummies 
for each year. The fixed-effect model without time dummies will be referred to as Model 
Fixed-One and the fixed-effect model with time dummies will be referred to as Model 
Fixed-Two. I also specified a random-effects model that allows for the intercept term to 
vary across banks, but it presumes that this variance arises from a firm-specific random 
error. The random-effects models without and with time dummies will be referred to as 
Model Random-one and Model Random-two, respectively.  
 
4.2 Discussion of the Variables 
Prior studies on market structure have developed different specifications in order 
to apply the PR methodology to the banking industry. For example, Molyneux et al. 
(1994) and  Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) have used the log ratio of interest revenue to 
total assets as the dependent variable, while Shaffer (1982), Nathan and Neave (1989), 
Vesala (1995), Coccorese (1998), and De Band and Davis (2000) have used the logarithm 
of interest revenues for the same purpose.  
In this study two different dependent variables are specified: INTREV as the ratio 
of total interest revenue to total assets in Models 1a and 2a, and TOTREV as the ratio of 
total (gross) operating revenue to total assets in Models 1b and 2b. The first specification 
in which the dependent variable is only the interest part of the total revenue is consistent 
with the approach that financial intermediation constitutes the core business in CEE 
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commercial banking. Although interest revenues still constitute the principal source of 
banks’ earnings, recent studies on banking activities report an increasing share of non-
interest income from fee-based products and services and off balance sheet credit 
substitutes in total revenues. Given the increased level of competition in financial 
markets, this can be explained partly by the desire of financial services firms to expand 
their revenue generating sources without altering their risk and thus their capital 
structures, materially. For this reason, it will be appropriate to include total revenues in 
an alternative model as the dependent variable.  
Other control variables are included in the Model to account for differences in 
bank-specific risk, size, and deposit structure of banks, and they are similar to those 
utilized in previous studies.  To take the country-specific characteristics into account, 
country dummy variables were also added in the pooled sample estimations. The two 
different risk variables employed are the log ratio of equity to total assets (EQTY) and 
the log ratio of loans to total assets (LOAN).  The size variable, log of total assets (TA), 
is used as a proxy for economies or diseconomies of scale, given the wide range of bank 
asset sizes in CEE banking systems. The ratio of Interbank deposits to customer and 
short-term funding (IBDP) accounts for differences in the deposit mix.  
Loans generally represent the biggest portion of earning assets and also convey 
information about bank’s risk preference. I expect a positive coefficient for the LOAN 
variable since more interest revenue is generated with increasing levels of loans. Equity 
to asset ratio is included to capture the effect of different risk levels among banks, with 
better capitalization ratios indicating lower risk levels. Lower capitalization ratios may 
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imply a more aggressive approach in lending with expectation of higher revenues. 
Therefore, the expected sign on the coefficient for capital ratio is negative. The size 
variable (TA) accounts for cost differences related to banks size and also controls for 
greater portfolio and loan diversification associated with larger banks. An important 
implication of asset diversification is less risk and hence a lower required rate of return. I 
do not know the ex-ante effect of size differentials in assets among banks on revenue 
generating process, and therefore I do not have any  expectation on the sign of the 
coefficient for the size variable. The Interbank deposit ratio (IBDP) variable is included 
in the analysis because interbank deposits imply higher interest costs relative to customer 
deposits and thus constitute a more expensive source of funds than other deposits. I 
expect the coefficient on this variable to be negative.   
 
4.3 Database and Sample Selection  
The banks in the sample comprise a fairly large portion of banking industry in 
Central and Eastern Europe over the period of 1993-2000.  Annual balance sheet and 
income statement data for the banks were taken from the BankScope data set provided by 
Fitch-IBCA, a London-based bank rating company. IBCA reports annual financial data in 
four different formats: Global-Summary, Global-Detailed, Spreadsheet, and Raw Data.  
The global formats allow for cross-country comparisons and have the same line item 
information.  However, it is most likely to be acknowledged that each country has its own 
reporting requirements and language for banking terms.  Because of this, the data set has 
a country-specific “spreadsheet” format that is more detailed than the global formats and 
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will have line items that are specific to that particular country.  Finally, the data set has 
the raw data format, which is the most detailed report available.  It contains the exact 
numbers that the bank files.  Since the banks followed and reported by BankScope 
represent a large proportion of banks in each country, this sample represents fairly the 
average bank in the region. I should, however, note that there are always discrepancies 
and inconsistencies in international data, and this is particularly true for the transition 
countries of Europe.  
In order to be able to perform reliable econometric analyses on bank competition 
the first requirement is to have sufficiently large sample of healthy banks for which 
financial data needed for the model variables are available. Some of the previous studies 
discussed in the literature review section focused their analyses to a single country, 
namely the USA, Canada and several other economically developed European countries, 
thanks to the availability of sufficiently large databases. The number of banks in 
transition countries is relatively small and the quality of financial reporting for these 
newly established institutions may not be at par. Nevertheless, the available data are 
utilized in various possible dimensions, after a rather rigorous sample selection process.  
The countries included are the Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, FYR of Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, the Slovak 
Republic, the Russian Federation, and Yugoslavia. The initial sample consisted of 2364 
observations on 562 financial institutions.  To be included in the final sample, banks had 
to be classified as commercial banks or cooperative banks in the BankScope data set and 
they must have all the model variables available for a given year. Bank holding 
companies, investment banks and securities houses, saving banks, real estate and 
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mortgage banks, non-banking credit institutions, and other specialized governmental 
credit institutions are excluded from the initial sample to make the data more comparable 
across countries.  96 % of the firms in the sample are consisted of commercial banks, and 
the remaining 4 % were cooperative banks. Due to the log linear specification in the 
estimated model, observations that have negative value on any of the explanatory 
variables are also dropped from the sample. The selection process yielded a unbalanced 
panel with 2113 observations belonging to 325 banks over the period 1993-2000. Table 
4.3 lists the number of banks in the sample by country and years. Not all the banks were 
in continuous operation over the entire period due to failures, mergers, and de novo entry. 
Table 4.4  presents the descriptive statistics of bank characteristics under investigation for 
each country for 1999.  All data are reported in US$ as the reference currency and 
corrected for inflation. Differences in the average banks size are substantial. The average 
Czech bank has more assets ($2.08 billion in 1999) than does the average bank in other 
CEE countries, followed by Polish and Hungarian banks. However, the average Polish 
bank has generated more loans than the average bank in other countries, followed by 
Czech and Estonian banks.  On average, banks in the Czech Republic and Poland have 
the highest equity capital on their balance sheets, followed by Hungarian banks.  
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       Chapter 5 
 
Empirical Results 
 
This chapter provides the results of the empirical estimation of the various models 
specified and discussed in chapter 4.  The chapter is divided into three sections. Section 
5.1 provides the results of the equilibrium tests. Section 5.2  presents the results of the 
competitive structure tests for CEE region and individual countries, respectively. Finally, 
relationship between competition, concentration, and bank performance is examined in 
Section 5.3.  
 
 
5.1. Equilibrium Test  
 
The equilibrium test is performed by running the regression model in Equation 
(4.6) in which return on assets (or return on equity) is employed as dependent variable. 
As suggested by Molyneux et al. (1994) we can verify the equilibrium by showing that 
factor prices are not correlated with bank returns. Under this specification H=0 suggests 
an equilibrium in the data.  The results of the long-run equilibrium tests for individual 
years and sample period for the pooled data are presented in Table 5.1.  The Wald test is 
used to test the H=0 hypothesis.  The models were estimated using OLS where the 
standard errors were calculated using White’s (1980) correction for heteroscedasticity. 
The regression coefficients of the unit price of funds, labor, and capital have mixed signs. 
The F-statistic for testing hypothesis H=0 indicates that  the null hypothesis can only be 
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rejected for the year 1997 at any conventional significance levels. The results reveal the 
existence of long-run equilibrium of the data for the majority of regressions, thus, 
implying that the Panzar and Rosse methodology can be used constructively to estimate 
market power. 19 
 
 
5.2  Competitive Structure Tests  
 
Compared to previous studies on bank competition that generally report cross-
sectional results for a single country, this study  has analyzed the available data in several 
dimensions. The econometric model with 4 different specifications was run on a pooled 
data set of the fourteen CEE countries to obtain a general picture of the competitive 
structure of economies in transition over the period of 1993-2000. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 
report the results of these estimations. For the overall  sample, the Model-1a and Model-
2a  were also estimated for three different time horizons-1993-2000, 1993-1996, and 
1997-2000.20  Panel A of Table 5.4  lists the results over these three time horizons. In 
order to account for geographical scope of banking services, I also defined two sub-
markets based on asset size, (large and small banks with total assets above and below the 
median asset size in the sample) and estimated their H-statistics. Estimation results for 
large and small banks are presented in Panel B of Table 5.4.  I also looked at the trend of 
                                                 
19 The same analyses are also performed  with return on equity is being the dependent variable. The results 
are qualitatively the same, suggesting the long-run equilibrium in data.  
20 The 1993-1996 period corresponds to the initial years of transition that were characterized by non-
performing loans of state-owned banks and bank failures due mainly to the problems of adjusting to the 
new system and worsened economic conditions. The 1997-2000 period is characterized by the completion 
of debt consolidation, recapitalization of banks, and privatization of major banks along with adoption of 
restrictive monetary policies to stabilize the economic systems and attain positive GDP growth.   
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changes in competitive conditions by running the regressions on cross-sectional data for 
each year. These results are reported in Panel C. Finally, I computed the competition 
index for individual countries over the sample period. These estimates are sumarized in 
Table 5.5. The detailed lists of parameter estimates for each country are provided in 
Tables 5.6 - 5.19.  
When using time series data in regressions, one must always check to make sure 
that all the assumptions of the classical linear regression model are satisfied. The 
presence of autocorrelation in the error terms of an OLS regression is a frequent problem 
in the analysis of time series data.  In the preliminary analyses, the results of the Durbin-
Watson autocorrelation tests suggested the existence of first order positive 
autocorrelation. The models are adjusted accordingly to correct for first order serial 
correlation.  
 
5.2.1 Estimation for the Overall Sample  
In this section, the econometric model is applied to a pooled sample of CEE banks 
to evaluate the competitive structure, assuming that banking markets of individual 
countries in the region possess similar characteristics and therefore the region can be 
considered as a single market. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 report the results of the regression 
analyses for the period 1993-2000.  
Although the coefficients on the bank specific factors are of secondary interest to 
competitive analysis, they are reported for the overall sample along with H statistics in 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3.  Other than random-effects models, the regression models estimated 
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all had R-squared values of 0.90 or higher and plausible parameter estimates. Note that, 
the sign on the size coefficient (LNTA) is generally positive and significant for most of 
the cases, suggesting that size differentials in assets among banks lead to higher interest 
revenues for the larger banks.  The positive sign on the coefficient for the loans-to-assets 
variable (LNLOAN) implies higher interest revenue per dollar of assets for banks with a 
higher proportion of loans on their portfolio. This is, of course, consistent with the 
expectations that higher level of loans will generate higher interest income. The risk 
coefficient, LNEQTY, is significant and has the expected negative sign, indicating that 
banks with low proportion of equity capital (riskier banks) are able to generate higher 
income per dollar of their assets. Another significant variable with negative coefficient is 
the deposit mix  (IBDP), and it suggests that banks, which obtain a higher proportion of 
their funds from retail (deposit) markets, are able to generate higher interest revenues per 
dollar of their assets compared to those banks that rely heavily on purchased funds. This 
is consistent with the notion that higher shares of “core deposits” in total funds imply the 
degree of retail operations where banks confront relatively less competition.  
The signs on the coefficients for the price of funds proxy (LNPF) and the price of 
labor proxy (LNPL) are always highly statistically significant and positive in all cases, as 
expected.  The price of funds input provides the highest contribution the explanation of 
bank revenues (thus to H-statistic), followed by price of labor. The coefficient of price of 
capital proxy is also positive and significant in most of the cases, and provides the least 
contribution to the H-statistic. In general, both models yield similar results and the 
explanatory power of the models is satisfactory. The country dummies also contribute 
significantly to the explanation of dependent variable. 
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As for the competitive structure tests, the following results are observed. For the 
OLS estimations, models with interest revenue as the dependent variable generally yield 
higher H-statistics, and for fixed and random effects estimations, models with total 
revenue as the dependent variable yield higher H-statistics. Furthermore, competition 
coefficients found by fixed and random effects estimations are relatively lower than that 
of OLS estimation. For the overall sample  (Tables 5.2 and 5.3), the mean levels of H 
values range from 0.46 (Model Fixed-one) to 0.58 (Model 1a) depending on the model 
specification and are significantly different from both zero and unity. This leads to the 
rejection of monopoly hypothesis, the conjectural variations short-run oligopoly 
hypothesis, and the hypothesis of perfect competition. These findings indicate that banks 
in this region have actually operated under monopolistic competition between 1993 and 
2000, as expected. Such findings of monopolistic competition have been also 
substantiated previously by Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) for the banks in 15 European 
Union countries.   
According to Table 5.4, the estimates of market power coefficient over the three 
periods 1993-2000, 1993-1996, and 1997-2000 are found to be 0.58, 0.54, and 0.59 
respectively, and they are statistically significantly different from the bipolar cases of 
unity and zero.  For both Models, the estimates for the periods 1993-96 and 1997-2000 
indicate a slight increase in H-values, as expected from the structural economic reforms 
over the sample period.  For individual years, these estimates range between 0.40 and 
0.69 for Model 1a and between 0.36 and 0.69 for Model 2a. They are also statistically 
significantly different from unity and zero. Similar to above conclusions, these results 
imply that competitive conduct of banks in this region cannot be characterized as purely 
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monopolistic or perfectly competitive between 1993 and 2000.  The cross-section 
estimates for each year indicate initially a decreasing trend between 1993 and 1996 and a 
subsequent increasing trend in competitive conditions after 1996, although the 
competitive conduct must still be characterized as monopolistic competition.  
According to both models in Panel B of Table 5.4,  the H-statistics for large banks 
are higher than those for smaller banks. Since H-statistic might be interpreted as a 
continuous measure of competitive conduct (that is higher H values refer to higher 
competition), we can say that large banks in transition countries operate in a relatively 
more competitive environment compared to small banks, or, in other words, competition 
is lower in local markets compared to national and international markets. This results are 
not surprising, since I expect that larger banks with international operations would 
confront higher competitive pressures from other Universal European banks.     
Overall, the results are consistent with the expectation that liberalization and 
deregulation of financial markets during the process of transition from command-based to 
market-based systems have increased the competitive conditions in CEE banking 
markets. This conjecture becomes noticeable especially after 1996 when transition 
countries had gone through a substantial privatization, experienced significant foreign 
bank participation in their markets due to a relatively more liberal financial structure, and 
adopted new regulations in order to comply with European banking standards before 
joining the European Union. This is, indeed the period when most of the structural 
reforms in the banking sectors had been fully absorbed and accommodated by the CEE 
countries.  
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 5.2.2  Estimation for the Individual Countries 
 
 Observing the structural differences suggested by significant country dummies 
estimated in the full sample analysis calls for the evaluation of competitive conditions at 
the country level. Furthermore, extending the competition analysis into national markets 
of CEE will also enable us to examine the relationship between competition, 
concentration, and performance. For these reasons, I extend the competitive analyses 
performed in the previous section to individual banking markets in the sample.  
 
 Table 5.5 summarizes the calculated market power coefficients of the separate 
analyses for each country over the sample period, with two different model 
specifications. In the majority of cases, the H-statistic is positive and significantly 
different from zero and unity. According to Model 1a, over the period 1993-2000, Latvia 
has the highest competitive index (0.75) and Slovakia has the lowest (0.09). The models 
fail to reject the hypothesis H=0 for Slovakia and FYR of Macedonia at the 95 percent 
confidence level.21 Therefore, I conclude that for the period 1993-2000 the banking 
markets of Slovakia and FYR of Macedonia can be characterized as monopolistic (or 
cases of perfectly colluding oligopoly or conjectural variations short-run oligopoly). 
 According to the above findings, I reject the monopoly and perfect competition 
hypotheses for individual countries (except for FYR of Macedonia and Slovakia) and 
conclude that banks in these countries seem to earn their revenues as if under the 
conditions of monopolistic competition. These results are also consistent with the 
                                                 
21 Model 1b  rejects the hypothesis H=0 for Slovakia but not for FYR of Macedonia. 
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expectation that liberalization and deregulation of CEE financial markets have increased 
the competitive conditions in CEE banking markets.  
 
5.3. Competition, Concentration, and Bank Performance 
 
Although results reported in the previous section suggest a high degree of 
competitiveness in CEE banking markets, they do not convey any information regarding 
the impact of concentration in competitive conduct and the effects of competition on 
bank performance. From the public policy perspective, it would be extremely beneficial 
to understand whether concentration impedes competitive pricing and whether high 
competition automatically translates into higher efficiency.  In the following sections I 
examine the relationship between the degree of competition (measured by H statistic as 
computed in this section) and the level of concentration (measured by 3-bank 
concentration ratio-CR3). I also investigate the effect of concentration and competition 
on bank performance measures such as cost and profit efficiency.   
 
5.3.1 Competition and Concentration  
 
As discussed in Section 3, the literature offers two competing hypotheses 
regarding the effect of concentration on the pricing behavior of banks. On the one hand, 
the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis suggests that banks operating in 
more concentrated markets can use their market power to extract high rents from their 
customers. The efficient structure hypothesis (ESH) on the other hand, suggests that 
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concentration might increase the overall efficiency of the banking markets if 
concentration is due to efficiency, or if more efficient banks grow at the expense of less 
efficient banks. If this be the case, banks in concentrated markets would price their 
services competitively at least up to a certain point.  
 
Table 5-20 presents average CR3 concentration index and the H statistics from 
Model-1a for individual countries over the sample period 1993-2000. Figure 1 shows a 
scatter of CR3 and H Statistics for each country and also provides an estimated linear 
regression line through these data points. Although the slightly downward sloping 
regression line suggests that higher concentration is associated with lower degree of 
competition, the negative slope of the regression line with a t-value of –0.71 is not 
statistically significant at any conventional significance levels.  Therefore these result of 
the empirical analysis  yields no significant relationship between concentration and 
collusive behavior.  
 
The results suggest that the highly concentrated banking markets of transition 
economies do not seem to lead to anti-competitive conduct as suggested by the traditional 
SCP hypothesis since the competitive analyses in the previous section consistently reject 
the existence of collusive behavior and the linear regression in this section does not yield 
a significant relationship between concentration and competition. These results seem to 
be compatible with contestable markets theory (CMT), if we can assume that incumbent 
firms set their prices close to the competitive level because of potential competition; 
otherwise higher prices will attract potential entrants with hit-and-run strategies. 
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Figure 1    
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5.3.2. Competition and Bank Performance  
 
 
In this section I investigate the relationship between competition and bank 
performance in CEE banking markets. For this reason, I use cost and profit efficiency 
measures as performance indicators. The efficiency analysis comprises two stages. In the 
first stage, I employ the standard translog specification to obtain efficiency estimates for 
individual banks in the sample. Since the production technologies of banks are unknown 
a priori, I estimate the efficiency measure as the deviation from the efficient frontier 
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where best-practice firms operate. In this approach, a frontier is established from the 
estimated cost or profit function of banks in the data while the inefficiencies or deviations 
from the frontier are represented by the error terms.  In the second stage, I explore the 
relationship between bank efficiency and market structure variables such as competition 
level and market concentration after accounting for certain bank-specific factors.   
I evaluate the performance of CEE banks using two different optimization 
concepts—cost minimization and alternative profit maximization. In this respect 
efficiency refers to the degree of managerial success on using inputs and outputs in a 
manner that will minimize costs and maximize profits. I employ two different efficiency 
estimation techniques, namely “Stochastic Frontier Analysis” (SFA) and the 
“Distribution-free Analysis” (DFA). These optimization concepts and estimation 
techniques are explained in detail in Yildirim and Philippatos (2002b). I also briefly 
explain the derivation of cost and profit frontiers and the multi-product translog 
functional form to estimate efficiency measures in Tables 5.21-5.23 in the appendix.  
 
5.3.2.1.Cost and Profit Efficiency Measures  
 
The mean cost and profit efficiencies obtained from the frontiers that were 
estimated by two different methods, i.e. SFA and DFA, are presented in Tables 5.24 and 
5.25. I report the results in four different truncation points (0, 1, 5, and 10%).  
 
Note that, the level of efficiency changes significantly with the level of truncation 
applied. For example, the average cost efficiency measured by the DFA for the overall 
sample changes from 40% to 66% when only 1% of extreme values are replaced by the 
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value of truncation point. The inefficiency level increases to 73% with 5% truncation. 
This might be due to persistent random factors that do not factor out completely over the 
sample period as assumed by the DFA approach. Following the prior literature, I will 
focus my analysis on the efficiency measures obtained by 5% truncation level.  
According to the SFA results at 5% truncation point, the average cost efficiency 
level for CEE countries under examination is 76%. This result suggests that, on average, 
about one-fourth of the bank resources are wasted during the provision of banking 
services in transition economies. The results of the analysis are comparable to that of 
previous studies of developed banking markets where operating inefficiencies are 
typically in the vicinity of 20% to 30%. According to these results Poland and Slovenia 
appear to be the most efficient countries while the Russian Federation and the three Baltic 
States (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) are the least efficient.   
The cost efficiency levels estimated by the DFA at 5 % truncation are slightly 
lower than those estimated by the SFA. The overall efficiency measure is 0.72 for the 
entire sample. The 72% efficiency measure means that the average bank needs 28% more 
resources to produce the same output as the average efficient bank. Based on the DFA 
results, Poland has the highest average efficiency level (81%) and Lithuania has the 
lowest  (63%). Given the relatively well-developed nature of the Polish banking industry 
this result does not come as a surprise. This result might partly be attributed to the 
increased foreign participation with more efficient operating techniques in Poland. The 
highly concentrated structure of the banking markets and the lack of competition might 
be the reasons for such low scores of efficiency in the Baltic States. For example, the 
Estonian banking market is highly concentrated and the three largest domestic banks 
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controlled more than 95% of total assets at the end of June 2000. The efficiency scores of 
other countries range between 66% and 80%, implying that an average bank in these 
countries can reduce its operating costs by 34% to 20% if it can adjust its operations 
according to the bank at the frontier. Overall, the results imply that, banks in transition 
economies can significantly reduce their production costs if they can utilize their 
productive inputs more efficiently.  
 
The results of the alternative profit efficiency estimation are presented in Table 
5.25. Here too, the levels of efficiency measures significantly vary with the level of 
truncation chosen. As in many previous researches, the alternative profit estimates are 
lower than those of cost efficiency (Berger and Mester (1997) for US banks; Maudos et 
al. (2002) for 10 EU member countries). According to the SFA, approximately one-third 
of banks’ profits are lost to inefficiency, and almost one-half according to the DFA. 
Estonia, Latvia, and FYR of Macedonia have the highest average profit efficiency level 
(69%) while Romania has the lowest (43%).  
 
5.3.2.2. Explaining the Determianants of  Efficiency 
 
Having documented the efficiency scores of each national banking industry, the 
next step is to determine whether the efficiency levels can be explained by market 
structure factors such as competition and concentration. For this purpose, I provide an 
explanatory analysis through examining the cross-sectional determinants of bank-specific 
efficiency by regressing these measures against a number of financial and structural 
variables.  
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Several bank- and industry-specific factors may influence the efficiency of a 
particular bank. Some of these factors may be neither inputs nor outputs in the production 
process, but rather circumstances faced by a particular bank. The variables consist of two 
groups-the first representing the nature of the market and regulatory structure in effect 
over the period examined and the second encompassing the firm-specific attributes.  
There are several ways by which market structure can affect the performance of 
financial intermediaries. Recent theoretic work in the economics of information 
postulates that under the setting of asymmetric information and uncertainty, competitive 
pressures serve as the most effective instrument in fostering productive efficiency (Hart, 
1983). Competition motivates management to operate closely to their production frontier 
and also, under the agency framework, provides the principals with relevant information 
for monitoring effectively the agent’s activities. Incumbent banks in an industry 
characterized by entry barriers are subject to a lesser degree of market discipline since the 
degree of competition they face will be relatively low. Therefore, I hypothesize that 
increased competition will improve bank efficiency. In order to account for the effect of 
the degree of competition (COMP), I use the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic as computed in 
the previous section.  
It is widely acknowledged that due to the lack of potential competition, banks in 
concentrated markets can exercise market power to earn monopoly profits and enjoy the 
luxury of operating in inefficient levels. The ICR3 variable, which represents the market 
share of the largest three banks in the industry, is used to capture the effect of market 
concentration on bank efficiency. As already discussed in Chapter 3, the two competing 
theories that explain the linkage between market concentration and firm performance are 
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the SCP paradigm and ESH. SCP paradigm asserts that concentration is the result of 
market power and conjectures a negative relation between concentration and efficiency. 
The ESH, in contrast, argues that efficient firms grow large at the expense of inefficient 
firms, and therefore anticipates a higher efficiency in concentrated markets. Hence, I do 
not have a strong ex-ante expectation on the sign of the concentration coefficient. 
The GDP variable represents the growth rate in state domestic product and is used 
as a proxy for local economic conditions. Favorable economic conditions will affect 
positively the demand and supply of banking services, and will possibly improve bank 
efficiency.  To distinguish between foreign and domestic banks I included the FOREIGN 
dummy variable. I expect to find higher efficiency measures for foreign-owned banks 
compared to domestically owned private or state banks. Similarly SPEC variable is used 
to distinguish between commercial and cooperative banks and accounts for the effect of 
bank specialization. I also specified the LISTED dummy variable to account for any 
systematic differences in efficiency levels of the publicly traded banks and private banks.   
The other  bank-specific variables included in the regressions are:  size 
(LNTA=log of total assets measured in thousands of US dollar); performance (ROA= net 
income as a fraction of total assets); capitalization (EQTY= book value of stockholders’ 
equity as a fraction of total assets); risk  (LOANS/TA= total loans over total assets, 
LLR/TL= Loan loss reserves as a fraction of gross loans); funding (CSTF=customer and 
short term funding over total funds; IBDP/TOTDEP= interbank deposits over total 
deposits) and off-balance sheet activity (OBSI/TA=off-balance sheet items over total 
assets) variables. 
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The second stage regressions were estimated using OLS, where the standard 
errors were calculated using White’s (1980) correction for heteroscedasticity. Table 5.26 
reports the definition of regression variables and the results of the estimation. Overall, 
most of the coefficients are significant.  
Among the market structure variables, the degree of competition has a positive 
influence on cost efficiency and a negative one on profit efficiency. These results suggest 
that the banks operating in more competitive and contestable markets are under more 
pressure to control their costs and cannot earn higher profits by exercising their potential 
market power. Consistent with this result, the negative and highly statistically significant 
relationship between industry concentration ratio and profit efficiency implies that 
profitability is not the result of concentration or market power. The GDP variable is 
positive indicating that favorable economic conditions improve bank efficiency. Foreign 
banks operating in transition countries appear to be more cost efficient but less profit 
efficient relative to domestically owned private banks and state-owned banks. The 
dummy variable representing bank specialization is significant only in the cost efficiency 
case indicating that commercial banks are less cost efficient relative to cooperative banks. 
Public trading dummy (LISTED) did not yield any significant relationship in both cost 
and profit efficiency models.  
As for the firm-specific variables, the coefficient on the size variable is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1 % level, indicating that, on average, larger banks 
attain a higher level of cost efficiency in their operations. This might be the result of the 
relaxation of asset restrictions in the banking system that allowed the banks to grow and 
venture into different banking business practices, and to accrue some economies of scale 
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and scope. Profit efficiency on the other hand does not seem to be linked to asset size at 
any conventional significance levels. The coefficient on the performance variable, ROA, 
is positive and significant, suggesting that greater cost and profit efficiency is linked to 
higher profitability. The level of equity capital is positively related with efficiency in both 
models. This finding is consistent with the results of the previous research that usually 
report higher cost and profit efficiency levels for well-capitalized banks. Banks with 
higher ratio of loans to assets are found to be more cost efficient. A negative and 
statistically significant LLR/TL coefficient indicates that a higher level of problem loans 
is associated with lower cost and profit efficiency levels. This result might suggest that 
efficient banks are very effective in evaluating credit risk (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). 
Efficient banks also appear to have higher customer and short tem funds in total funding 
and low interbank deposit ratios. Finally, banks with higher level of off-balance sheet 
activities are found to be significantly more cost and profit efficient.   
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Chapter 6 
Summary and Conclusions 
This study examines the competitive conditions in fourteen Central and Eastern 
European countries’ banking industry while explicitly controlling for the bank specific 
factors such as risk, size,  and deposit mix for the period 1993-2000. Furthermore, this 
study also examines the relationship between the degree of competition and 
concentration, and their effects on bank performance for the sample period. For the 
transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe, this period corresponds to an era 
characterized by substantial reform programs to restructure their planned economies into 
market-based economies, and to liberalize and deregulate sufficiently their financial 
systems in order to  integrate economically with the advanced western world.   
The basis for the evaluation of competitive situation is the extant oligopoly theory 
in the new industrial organization literature, specifically, the competition model 
developed by Rosse and Panzar (1977). This approach relies on the premise that, in their 
long-run equilibrium, banks will employ different pricing strategies in response to a 
change in input costs depending on the market structure in which they operate. The 
results of the equilibrium tests reveal the existence of long-run equilibrium of the data for 
the majority of regressions, thus,  implying that the  Rosse and Panzar methodology can 
be used constructively to estimate market power. 
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6.1 Summary of the Empirical Findings and Limitations of the Research 
 
The results of the competition analysis suggest that the banking markets of CEE 
countries cannot be characterized by the bipolar cases of either perfect competition or 
monopoly over 1993-2000 except for FYR of Macedonia and Slovakia.  That is, banks 
earned their revenues as if operating under conditions of monopolistic competition in that 
period. Overall, large banks in transition countries operate in a relatively more 
competitive environment compared to small banks, or in other words, competition is 
lower in local markets compared to national and international markets. Finally, the cross-
sectional analysis of competitive structure shows initially a decreasing trend between 
1993 and 1996 and a subsequent increasing trend in competitive conditions after 1996, 
revealing the inevitable impact of liberalization on competitive conditions.  As an overall 
conclusion, for the region and individual countries under investigation, the banking 
market structure can be characterized as monopolistic competition. This conclusion holds 
under a variety of specifications controlling for bank-size, risk and various deposit 
composition characteristics, and a number of estimation techniques.  
Although the coefficients of control variables in competition analysis are of 
secondary interest, I think they are worth mentioning since they might be helpful in 
understanding the effects of bank-specific factors in revenue generating process in CEE 
banking markets. Specifically, I find that size differentials in assets among CEE banks 
lead to higher interest revenues for the larger banks.  Higher interest revenue per dollar of 
assets for banks is associated with a higher proportion of loans on their portfolio. Results 
also suggest that banks, which obtain a higher proportion of their funds from retail 
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markets, are able to generate higher interest revenues per dollar of their assets. Finally, 
riskier banks are found to be able to generate higher income per dollar of their assets.  
In this research I also investigate the relationship between competition and 
concentration, and their effects on bank performance. The simple linear regression 
between competition and concentration does not yield any significant relationship, 
suggesting the possibility that higher contestability, in part due to the recent technological 
advances, have resulted in an overall increase in competition, despite high level of market 
concentration. 
Regarding the bank performance, I find that the average bank deviates 
substantially from the best-practice frontier. The managerial inefficiencies in CEE 
banking markets were found to be significant, with average cost efficiency levels of 72 
and 76 percent by DFA and SFA.  Overall, these average estimates suggest that an 
average bank would have incurred 28 to 24 percent less of its actual costs had it matched 
its performance with the best-practiced bank. According to the results Poland and 
Slovenia appear to be the most cost efficient countries while the Russian Federation and 
the three Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) are the least efficient.  The 
alternative profit efficiency levels are found to be significantly lower relative to cost 
efficiency. According to SFA, approximately one-third of banks’ profits are lost to 
inefficiency, and almost one-half according to the DFA. Among the countries under 
examination Estonia, Latvia, and Macedonia have the highest average profit efficiency 
level (69%) while Romania has the lowest (43%).  
 The results of the second-stage regression analyses of bank performance suggest 
that higher efficiency levels are associated with larger banks, higher profitability and 
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better capitalization. Banks that heavily rely on core deposits in funding their assets are 
found to be more efficient. Consistent with most prior research, a higher level of problem 
loans is associated with lower efficiency levels. Regarding the effect of market structure 
on bank performance, the level of competition is found to increase efficiency while 
market concentration is negatively linked to efficiency.  Favorable economic conditions 
seem to improve bank performance as reflected by a positive relation between GDP 
growth and efficiency. Finally, foreign banks operating in transition countries are found 
to be more cost efficient but less profit efficient relative to domestically owned private 
banks and state-owned banks. 
Overall, findings of competition analyses are consistent with previous research on 
competitive conditions in the banking industries of developed countries that generally 
report varying degrees of monopolistic competition.  The notion that high concentration 
in CEE banking markets will result in monopoly rents as suggested by SCP paradigm is 
not supported by empirical results. These results seem to be compatible with contestable 
markets theory (CMT), if one can assume that incumbent firms set their prices close to 
the competitive level because of potential competition; otherwise higher prices will 
attract potential entrants with hit-and-run strategies. These results are also consistent with 
the expectation that liberalization and deregulation of CEE financial markets have 
increased the competitive conditions in CEE banking markets. However, I should also 
note that the period under investigation corresponds to the early years of the ongoing 
transition from central planning when these countries were lacking many market-
supportive institutions essential for efficient financial markets. Therefore, the results of 
this study should be interpreted with the necessary scholarly scrutiny. 
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6.2 Policy Implications of the Results 
 
In summarizing the specific results of this study, I would also like to make the 
following remarks regarding the policy questions raised in the introductory section. First 
of all, CEE countries deserve to be given special attention and enough credit for their 
achievements in building market-oriented banking systems from almost scratch in such a 
short time period. Despite the considerable disparities among their progress of 
achievement, in less than a decade they have passed the threshold point of other market 
economies that made them  part of the free world—a progress that took several decades 
to achieve for the developed western countries.   
Broadly speaking, they were rather successful in certain areas of structural 
reforms such as effective design and implementation of the privatization process, 
competitive policies, and prudential regulatory framework. With regard to privatization 
and foreign bank participation, in many of these countries the private sector currently 
holds more than 70 percent of the assets in banking—a figure which is quite comparable 
to that of many western economies- and  more than half of the assets in the CEE banking 
industry are owned by foreign institutions. The results of the current study suggests that 
CEE banks increased their competitiveness to a certain degree with large scale 
privatization and foreign participation in their banking systems. It is expected that CEE 
banks will continue to respond to increased competition by extending the scope of 
professional services beyond traditional markets, generating other revenue sources by 
offering new services and products, focusing on non-interest income-generating 
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activities, reducing excess capacity through mergers and/or branch closures, and 
upgrading their operations through new technology. 
Building strong institutions and effective governance was, and will be, the key 
element throughout the ongoing transition process, which requires market-oriented 
financial structures. Therefore, it is essential to establish a prudentially regulated entry  
policy and careful supervision for both domestic and foreign participation in managing 
the transition process by avoiding financial distress which is likely to be caused by 
competitive pressures.  Due to their liberal licencing policies, CEE countries experienced 
a rapid growth of new commerical banks during the early  years of transition. Since the 
markets to be served were initially limited, near exponential growth of commercial banks 
caused detrimental effects on banks’ financial positions. As the free market system 
unfolded, the positive  role the foreign banks played became more significant. The entry 
of foreign banks had a  crucial impact on the modernization of domestic banking systems 
through the introduction of modern banking practices, and product and service 
innovation. Regarding the openness and expansion of the banking markets, the results 
suggest that CEE economies  should keep their markets open to well-established 
European banks rather than adopting strictly selective policies if they want to seize the 
maximum benefit from best-practices of sound financial institutions and to increase the 
competitiveness and efficiency in their banking markets. Indeed, under the Association 
Agreements between EU and candidates, openness to foreign participation is also a 
necessary condition  to meet the criteria dictated  by the Second Banking Directive that 
enable any EU member bank freely operate in other member countries’  banking markets.  
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With respect to developing their capital markets and making the transition from 
“bank-based” to “capital market-based” financial systems I can draw the following 
inferences:  
(a) As the empirical results indicate, the CEE economies have brought their “bank-based” 
financial systems to the relatively high state of contestability that is somewhat 
comparable to that of the small economies of western Europe.   
(b) All regulatory reforms and restructuring achieved nearly the desired results and made 
banking more competitive. Any further improvements can only come from focusing 
attention to improving the tentative status of capital markets in the CEE countries.  
(c) As conditions in CEE capital markets improve, it is expected that commercial banks 
will engage in “investment banking” activities for IPOs and SEOs, thus enhancing non-
interest income sources. And this fee income will, in turn, further enhance “market 
contestability” as measured by the PR H-statistic.  
 
6.3 Avenues For the Future Research 
 
The growth of research and knowledge about the process of political, social, and 
economic transition from command economies to market economy has been substantial 
over the recent years.  I believe that this infant area will continue to receive a great deal 
of attention, particularly because a number of interesting questions have been suggested 
by the examination of competitive structure. For example, It would  be interesting for 
future research to inquire: How did banks react to the European unification in 
anticipation of increased competition? Which banking activities in the region are likely to 
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be affected because of the EMU? What organizational rearrangement banks have 
experienced in response to changing competitive conditions? Another interesting topic 
might be answering the question whether efficiency gains derived from increased 
competition are passed onto bank customers as reduced costs or improved product and 
service quality? Finally, previous research reports substantial evidence of a positive 
relationship between the level of development of the financial markets and economic 
growth. (See,  among others, McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), and more recently Pagano 
(1993), King and Levine (1993), and Levine and Zervos (1998)). Keeping up with the 
current research, the next avenue would be to examine whether the findings of these 
authors hold for the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe.  
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  Table 2.1    Banking Supervision in Central and Eastern Europe  
 
  
BUL 
 
CRO 
 
CZR 
 
EST 
 
HUN 
 
LAT 
 
LIT 
 
POL 
 
ROM 
 
SLK 
 
SLV 
            
Supervisora CB CB CB CB SA+CB CB CB CB CB CB SA+CB 
Capital  
Requirement 
($mn)  
5.5 3 15 5.5 0.1-15 5.5 5.5 6 6.2 14.4 4.1 
Capital 
Adequacy (%)  12 8 8 10 8 10 10 8/12-15 8 8 8 
Large Credit 
Exposures  
25% of 
capital  
20 % of 
capital  
25% of 
capital  
25% of 
own 
funds 
25% of 
capital  
25% of 
capital  
25% of 
capital  
15% of 
capital  
20% of 
capital of 
non-bank 
equity  
25% of 
capital  
25% of 
capital  
Total non-
bank 
participations  
N.A. 70 % of capital  
25 % of 
capital  - 
51 % of 
capital  
60 % of 
own 
funds 
10 % of 
capital  
25 % of 
capital  
20% of 
capital of 
non-bank 
equity  
25 % of 
capital  N.A. 
Deposit 
Insurance 
Under 
considerati
on  
$11,700 $2,900 
In 
Preparati
on 
$4,900 None $12,500 $3,400 $2,500 Being set up N.A. 
Reserves/ 
 Provisions  
for bad debts 
1.25% 
loans; 
according 
to risk 
categories  
Provisions 
for different 
risk 
categories  
1% loans; 
Provisions 
for different 
risk 
categories  
Yes 
1.25 % 
loans; 
Provisions 
for different 
risk 
categories  
Accordi
ng to 
risk 
categori
es  
Yes 
1% loans; 
Provisions 
for 
different 
risk 
categories  
2% loans 
1% loans; 
Provisions 
for different 
risk 
categories  
N.A. 
Reform             
Banking  2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Markets 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 3 2 3 3 
 
Source: Scholtens (2000) p. 543 
aCB=Central Bank; SA=Supervisory Authority (other than central bank). 
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  Table 2.2      Foreign Bank Ownership in Selected CEE Countries1 
 
  Total Assets Foreign 
Control2 
Total 
Assets 
Foreign 
Participation 
Foreign 
Control2 
Foreign 
Control3 
  Dec-94 Dec-94 Dec-98 Dec-99 Dec-99 Dec-99 
  (Billion 
US$) 
(%) (Billion 
US$) 
(%) (%) (%) 
Czech 
Republic 
46.6 5.8 63.4 47.3 49.3 50.7 
Hungary 26.8 19.8 32.6 59.5 56.6 80.4 
Poland 39.4 2.1 91.1 36.3 52.8 52.8 
 
 Source : IMF staff estimates based on data from Fitch IBCA's BankScope Database 
1Ownership data reflect changes up to December 1999 while balance sheet data are the most recent available in FITCH       
IBCA's BankScope 
 2 Ratio of assets of banks where foreigners own more than 50 percent of total equity to total bank assets 
3  Same as footnote 2 but at 40 percent level  
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  Table- 2.3      3-Bank Concentration Ratios for CEE Banking industry (1993-1999) 
 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1993-1999 
Bulgaria  93.4 84.0 67.4 77.4 60.3 59.5 58.9 71.6 
Croatia  72.5 70.1 66.9 58.9 51.6 56.9 58.4 62.2 
Czech Republic  77 71.2 63.8 63 62.3 57.6 61.5 65.2 
Estonia  77.0 71.2 63.8 72.5 72.6 98.9 98.9 79.3 
Hungary  66.7 52.7 54.6 52.8 46.1 48.1 46.1 52.4 
Latvia  81.1 58.7 49.3 44.5 44.5 54.8 52.6 55.1 
Lithuania 100 98 97.5 88.2 71.7 75.3 92.8 89.1 
FYR of Macedonia  100.0 58.7 56.2 83.8 84.6 80.0 81.6 77.8 
Poland  60.6 58.7 56.2 54.4 45.9 45.2 44.3 52.2 
Romania  99.3 93.8 88.4 74.8 64 57.6 64.7 77.5 
Russian Federation  64.8 47.1 48.7 52.9 27.3 63.3 36.5 48.7 
Slovakia  91.6 86.8 78.3 68.9 62.5 54.6 62.7 72.2 
Slovenia  62.5 74.4 66.9 56.7 57.6 59.8 59.6 62.5 
Yugoslavia    90.5 82.7 76.6 75.5 86.0 93.0 84.0 
Average  80.5 72.6 67.2 66.1 59.0 64.1 65.1   
Source: Author’s calculations based on BankScope data set 
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   Table 2.4      Balance Sheets for CEE Banks (1999) 
 
The value of each item is calculated as a fraction of the book value of total assets and then averaged across all banks reporting balance sheets in the country.
 BUL CRO CZR EST HUN LAT LIT MAC POL ROM RUS SLVK SLVN YUG 
ASSETS                
Loans  33.7 51.8 34.0 51.9 49.0 51.8 39.9 41.4 48.0 27.7 45.1 54.7 46.2 33.4 
Other Earning Assets  53.8 36.3 52.3 30.1 39.5 22.4 42.6 35.7 43.4 54.9 31.2 37.0 44.5 42.0 
Total Earning Assets  87.5 88.1 86.3 82.0 88.6 74.1 82.5 77.2 91.5 82.6 76.3 91.6 90.7 75.5 
Fixed Assets  4.9 6.4 4.6 7.9 2.7 10.8 5.4 7.1 2.4 11.6 4.8 3.9 4.0 5.5 
Non-Earning Assets 7.6 5.7 9.1 10.1 8.8 15.0 12.1 15.7 6.1 5.8 19.0 4.5 5.2 19.0 
Total Assets  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
               
LIABILITIES               
Cust. & ST Funding  76.3 62.1 79.4 64.0 78.3 70.5 75.9 64.3 77.9 75.1 73.3 81.2 86.2 50.9 
Other Funding  0.1 13.2 5.8 19.5 7.3 6.9 8.2 1.1 0.5 0.2 1.8 3.5 2.4 16.1 
Other (Non-Int. bearing)  4.1 3.6 5.6 4.4 4.0 3.9 2.9 4.8 5.5 3.7 6.2 4.5 2.9 8.9 
Loan Loss Reserves  . 2.6 0.8 . . . . . 0.1 . . 0.2 . . 
Other Reserves  1.4 1.1 2.0 1.3 1.5 . . . 0.5 . 0.0 . . . 
Equity  19.4 20.9 12.3 11.9 10.1 19.6 12.9 29.7 15.9 21.1 18.9 10.8 8.6 24.1 
Total Liabilities & Equity 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
               
Off Balance Sheet Items  11.5 14.8 25.1 27.9 53.3 8.1 5.6 16.5 0.8 8.1 38.4 25.0 33.3 14.3 
Loan Loss Reserves  6.5 7.6 6.4 3.3 1.3 3.2 2.7 7.2 2.2 2.0 5.1 3.4 5.9 7.6 
Liquid Assets  52.2 20.5 32.7 3.0 9.0 24.7 8.1 40.0 9.4 49.9 39.0 12.9 40.2 40.3 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on BankScope Data  
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   Table 2.5   Selected Financial Ratios for CEE Banks (1999) 
 
Ratios BUL CRO CZR EST HUN LAT LIT MAC POL ROM RUS SLVK SLVN YUG 
Asset Quality                
Loan Loss Reserve / Gross Loans    13.2 12.7 15.1 6.3 3.1 6.7 6.0 14.0 4.0 6.5 11.2 9.2 5.4 24.2 
Loan Loss Prov / Net Int Rev    26.8 58.3 53.7 43.1 20.4 66.6 23.2 42.1 15.9 12.3 26.6 102.1 28.3 103.0 
Loan Loss Res / Non Perf Loans    66.6 84.5 47.0 57.4 101.2 83.4 77.3 313.1 64.5 77.1 249.0 164.0 73.4 194.2 
Non Perf Loans / Gross Loans    28.6 16.8 35.0 10.2 7.9 7.8 9.1 5.6 7.0 9.2 8.1 7.9 9.2 8.2 
Capital                
Total Capital Ratio    43.6 25.6 24.3 14.8 13.2 20.4 21.5 29.6 19.7 43.8 39.0 16.5 15.8 34.3 
Equity / Total Assets    19.4 20.9 12.3 11.9 10.1 12.9 19.6 29.7 15.9 21.1 18.9 8.6 10.8 24.1 
Equity / Net Loans    108.8 43.2 47.5 23.2 20.8 39.2 39.5 88.8 33.9 96.3 54.8 21.8 20.4 121.3 
Equity / Cust & ST Funding    29.6 44.2 11.7 18.6 14.1 20.8 31.8 49.9 32.4 37.2 40.7 10.5 13.5 56.4 
Cap Funds / Tot Assets  17.8 21.3 9.8 . 14.1 . . 27.6 14.6 22.4 19.7 9.5 13.5 23.5 
Operations                
Net Interest Margin    5.5 6.2 2.3 5.2 4.2 5.4 5.8 8.0 5.2 13.4 7.2 2.9 3.6 6.8 
Net Int Rev / Avg Assets    4.8 5.4 2.0 4.2 3.6 4.5 4.3 5.9 4.7 10.6 5.0 2.6 3.3 5.0 
Non Int Exp / Avg Assets    7.9 8.1 4.3 8.5 5.4 9.1 7.5 9.7 5.1 12.1 11.6 3.2 5.1 10.4 
Return on Average Assets (ROAA)   1.0 0.9 -1.1 0.4 0.3 -0.6 0.6 2.7 1.0 0.9 4.8 1.2 0.9 0.7 
Return on Average Equity (ROAE)   7.8 11.6 -14.4 1.7 1.9 2.3 6.7 7.9 2.1 4.9 27.7 15.9 7.8 3.8 
Cost to Income Ratio    75.5 71.4 67.8 81.1 83.7 95.8 80.5 57.7 54.2 106.0 68.0 74.1 73.2 64.3 
Liquidity                
Interbank Ratio    472.9 385.7 155.7 230.6 185.4 309.9 160.6 327.4 124.0 382.4 184.6 181.6 117.8 139.9 
Net Loans / Total Assets    33.7 51.8 34.0 51.9 49.0 39.9 51.8 41.4 48.0 27.7 45.1 46.2 54.7 33.4 
Net Loans / Customer & ST Fund. 47.1 91.0 44.4 84.1 64.3 58.6 75.1 66.2 67.2 37.9 71.2 53.8 67.8 70.8 
Net Loans / Tot Dep & Bor    42.7 76.0 45.7 . 61.9 . . 67.5 68.0 35.9 71.4 53.4 67.2 66.8 
Liquid Assets / Cust & ST Fund.  70.2 36.6 42.1 4.6 11.9 11.2 37.4 63.9 11.8 68.5 55.3 47.0 16.0 83.1 
Source: Author’s calculation based on BankScope Data 
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  Table 3.1    Interpretation of  H-statistic 
Estimated H Competitive Environment Test  Equilibrium Test  
H ≤ 0 
Monopoly equilibrium 
Perfectly colluding oligopoly 
Conjectural variations short-run oligopoly 
 
H < 0   Disequilibrium  
H=0     Equilibrium 
0<H<1 Monopolistic competition free entry equilibrium. 
 
H=1 
Perfect competition 
Natural monopoly in a perfectly contestable 
market 
Sales maximizing firm subject to breakeven 
constraint. 
 
Source: Molyneux et al. (1994)  
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 Table   3.2   Summary of Literature on Measuring Bank Competition Using P-R 
Methodology 
Authors Period Countries Considered Results 
Nathan and Neave 
(1989) 
 
1982-1984
 
Canada 
1982:Perfect Competition 
1983-1984:Monopolistic Competition 
Shaffer (1982) 1979 New York Monopolistic competition 
Molyneux et al. (1994) 1986-1989
France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain, United 
Kingdom 
Monopoly for Italy 
Monopolistic competition for France, 
Germany, Spain, UK 
Vesala (1995) 1985-1992 Finland 
Monopolistic competition for all but two 
years 
Molyneux et al (1996) 1986-1988 Japan 
1986:Monopoly 
1988: Monopolistic competition 
Coccorese (1998) 1988-1996 Italy Monopolistic competition 
De Bandt and 
Davis(1999) 
1992-1996
France, Germany, 
Italy 
Large banks: monopolistic competition 
in all countries; 
Small banks: monopolistic competition 
in Italy, monopoly in France and 
Germany 
Rime (1999) 1987-1994 Switzerland Monopolistic competition 
Hondroyiannis et al. 
(1999)  
1993-95 Greece Monopolistic competition 
Bikker and Groeneveld 
(2000) 
1989-1996 15 EU countries Monopolistic competition 
Bikker and Haaf (2000) 1988-1998
23 Industrialized 
countries 
Whole sample: Monopolistic 
competition 
Large banks: Monopolistic competition 
in general, several exceptions of perfect 
competition  
Monopoly for small banks in Australia 
and Greece 
Source: Bikker and Haaf (2000)  (Updated) 
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   Table 4.1   Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables  
                           (Variables other than ratios are in 1000s of US Dollars) 
 
Variable Name Specification   Mean  Std. Dev Min  Max  
Interest Revenue (INTREV) Ratio of total interest revenue to total assets 0.13 0.10 0.0031 0.95 
Total Revenue (TOTREV)   Ratio of total operating revenue to total assets 0.19 0.19 0.000 1.94 
Price of Funds (PF) Ratio of interest expenses to deposits and other liabilities  0.10 0.11 0.0002 0.92 
Price of labor (PL) Ratio of personnel expenses to total assets 0.02 0.02 0.0003 0.27 
Price of physical capital  (PK) Ratio of non-interest expenses to fixed assets 0.05 0.13 0.0000 2.24 
Total Assets (TA) Total assets 836780 1954800 71.8100 19554211 
Fixed Assets (FA) Fixed assets 34107.88 89327.36 1.0000 1699595 
Equity (EQTY) Ratio of equity capital to total assets 0.16 0.15 0.000 0.95 
Deposit Mix (IBDP) Ratio of interbank deposits to customer and short-term funding 0.27 0.26 0 1 
Loans (LOAN) Ratio of net loans to total assets 0.41 0.18 0 1 
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  Table 4.2    Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables for Individual Countries1. 
STATE   Variable Name  N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Czech  Interest Revenue (INTREV) 180 0.0872523 0.0387806 0.0121169 0.3456362
 Total Revenue (TOTREV) 180 0.1084006 0.0450301 0.0313545 0.3593143
 Price of Funds  (PF) 180 0.0745252 0.0514919 0.0092871 0.5101137
 Price of Labor (PL)  180 0.0097212 0.0089039 0.0006124 0.0791636
 Price of Physical capital (PK) 180 0.0116052 0.01916 0.0000115 0.1383548
 Total Assets (TA)  180 2248104.3 3804472.4 30965.87 16538782.4
 Fixed Assets (FA)  180 80228.53 160444.1 409.91 699107.27
 Equity (EQTY)  180 0.0820106 0.0887462 -0.2274004 0.9503332
 Deposits Mix (IBDP) 180 0.4500421 0.2594344 1.48E-06 1
  Loans (LOAN)  180 0.4049209 0.1877677 0.0028867 0.8543697
    
Estonia  Interest Revenue (INTREV) 43 0.0772435 0.0242754 0.0440143 0.1752777
 Total Revenue (TOTREV) 43 0.1145683 0.0295589 0.065604 0.2103322
 Price of Funds  (PF) 43 0.0389225 0.0141227 0.0137543 0.0865698
 Price of Labor (PL)  43 0.0260872 0.0140452 0.0062184 0.0633943
 Price of Physical capital (PK) 43 0.0416489 0.0242465 0.0048976 0.1370147
 Total Assets (TA)  43 401116.65 618478.94 3905.46 2710822.96
 Fixed Assets (FA)  43 21722.6 26381.64 192.93 103504.85
 Equity (EQTY)  43 0.113748 0.0655945 0.0466183 0.3604732
 Deposits Mix (IBDP) 43 0.210588 0.2195405 0.000364617 0.9681782
  Loans (LOAN)  43 0.4714493 0.1121781 0.2498261 0.6432901
    
Croatia Interest Revenue (INTREV) 253 0.1136278 0.1247465 0.0051355 0.946884
 Total Revenue (TOTREV) 253 0.1592201 0.1550068 0.0372168 1.2073771
 Price of Funds  (PF) 253 0.082303 0.1256797 0.0086976 0.9158111
 Price of Labor (PL)  246 0.0282295 0.0236198 0.0023343 0.2213674
 Price of Physical capital (PK) 253 0.0410138 0.0423551 0.0026744 0.3046759
 Total Assets (TA)  253 378877.73 763617.52 3916.55 4593289.62
 Fixed Assets (FA)  253 18786.84 43803.31 1 304233.69
 Equity (EQTY)  253 0.2127244 0.1555226 -0.1322112 0.9034268
 Deposits Mix (IBDP) 253 0.123215 0.164297 9.44E-06 0.9603943
  Loans (LOAN)  253 0.4463331 0.1592683 0.002518 0.8039897
       
Hungary Interest Revenue (INTREV) 178 0.1262331 0.0466762 0.0334232 0.3152874
 Total Revenue (TOTREV) 178 0.160738 0.0633444 0.0594789 0.564222
 Price of Funds  (PF) 178 0.1017652 0.0453743 0.0287929 0.277722
 Price of Labor (PL)  134 0.0175173 0.0106274 0.004498 0.066903
 Price of Physical capital (PK) 178 0.0383959 0.0328632 0.0042578 0.191895
 Total Assets (TA)  178 917838.06 1433259.07 24722.79 7985715.1
 Fixed Assets (FA)  178 39644.8 65893.17 148.96 360285.37
 Equity (EQTY)  178 0.1075873 0.0632982 -0.0671982 0.4286402
 Deposits Mix (IBDP) 178 0.3937845 0.243259 0.0000355 1
  Loans (LOAN)  178 0.438878 0.1713573 0.0629758 0.9597378
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  Table 4.2 Continued  
Lithuania  Interest Revenue (INTREV) 50 0.0861744 0.06025 0.0247352 0.3668564
 Total Revenue (TOTREV) 50 0.1252135 0.0700556 0.0209035 0.4152205
 Price of Funds  (PF) 50 0.0558487 0.0545462 0.0090093 0.3297422
 Price of Labor (PL)  50 0.0343934 0.0137351 0.0117187 0.0751374
 Price of Physical capital (PK) 50 0.0329902 0.0149267 0.0070923 0.0891314
 Total Assets (TA)  50 234819.1 312735.45 9250 1386300
 Fixed Assets (FA)  50 18770.34 20860.62 974.73 72829.97
 Equity (EQTY)  50 0.1441787 0.1529374 -0.2746703 0.6184972
 Deposits Mix (IBDP) 50 0.2559591 0.2629081 0.0018468 1
  Loans (LOAN)  50 0.4712993 0.1234593 0.2301136 0.7919621
       
Latvia  Interest Revenue (INTREV) 127 0.0839826 0.0501614 0.0132157 0.2631581
 Total Revenue (TOTREV) 127 0.1340679 0.074658 -0.1106195 0.4146343
 Price of Funds  (PF) 127 0.0438054 0.0488988 0.0085959 0.4112756
 Price of Labor (PL)  123 0.0277186 0.0300312 0.0022727 0.2708695
 Price of Physical capital (PK) 127 0.0544938 0.0534948 0.0073349 0.4085546
 Total Assets (TA)  127 115462.06 153125.54 1135.75 871125.61
 Fixed Assets (FA)  127 5747.81 7412.84 78.1 41598.69
 Equity (EQTY)  127 0.1306896 0.1321981 -0.4454277 0.8058534
 Deposits Mix (IBDP) 127 0.1822829 0.2174208 5.38E-08 0.9850747
  Loans (LOAN)  127 0.2949127 0.1988333 0.0034464 0.7636362
       
FYRM Interest Revenue (INTREV) 48 0.1151924 0.0969766 0.0468826 0.6593867
 Total Revenue (TOTREV) 48 0.2583094 0.1469019 0.0927476 0.7967519
 Price of Funds  (PF) 48 0.0679158 0.0991528 0.0052463 0.6747251
 Price of Labor (PL)  44 0.026046 0.0110989 0.010658 0.0679137
 Price of Physical capital (PK) 48 0.0461822 0.0330094 0.0119945 0.1431506
 Total Assets (TA)  48 101201.45 158195.52 6806.79 766772.59
 Fixed Assets (FA)  48 6050.84 7348.95 71.98 26996.07
 Equity (EQTY)  48 0.3358402 0.1639442 0.0520947 0.7412361
 Deposits Mix (IBDP) 48 0.1848892 0.144928 0.000150148 0.6583428
  Loans (LOAN)  48 0.3958752 0.1808295 0.0677198 0.8001533
       
Poland  Interest Revenue (INTREV) 279 0.1348259 0.0433996 0.0121596 0.3098252
 Total Revenue (TOTREV) 279 0.1635668 0.0475196 0.0173058 0.3435805
 Price of Funds  (PF) 279 0.1121441 0.0570257 0.0083516 0.6707073
 Price of Labor (PL)  262 0.0214215 0.0107542 0.000701015 0.0834782
 Price of Physical capital (PK) 279 0.0095676 0.0162228 0.000029973 0.1037736
 Total Assets (TA)  279 1610945.03 2903889.26 9370.31 16669836.7
 Fixed Assets (FA)  279 49917.93 91726.86 208.66 481766.38
 Equity (EQTY)  279 0.1392519 0.1532416 -0.5714686 0.8193429
 Deposits Mix (IBDP) 279 0.301876 0.2625695 0.000025331 0.9890712
  Loans (LOAN)  279 0.4286273 0.1649377 9.72E-07 0.8998628
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  Table 4.2 Continued 
Romania  Interest Revenue (INTREV) 98 0.2519724 0.1312942 0.0232988 0.5653682
 Total Revenue (TOTREV) 98 0.3074089 0.1465702 0.0285104 0.8593636
 Price of Funds  (PF) 98 0.2047187 0.133105 0.0156849 0.6739235
 Price of Labor (PL)  84 0.0394325 0.0280681 0.0055413 0.2189461
 Price of Physical capital (PK) 98 0.046507 0.0340661 0.0019603 0.1932107
 Total Assets (TA)  98 543425.5 981493.84 1405.65 4514151.28
 Fixed Assets (FA)  98 51937.95 92352.87 330.86 375138.04
 Equity (EQTY)  98 0.2023852 0.1533112 -0.290123 0.7529236
 Deposits Mix (IBDP) 98 0.2110239 0.2053267 0.000043 0.8161653
  Loans (LOAN)  98 0.3421001 0.187991 0.0004621 0.848106
       
Russian Fed Interest Revenue (INTREV) 426 0.1592358 0.1185664 0.0031092 0.7954628
 Total Revenue (TOTREV) 424 0.2482925 0.1685821 -0.0675274 1.5386667
 Price of Funds  (PF) 426 0.1429765 0.1399552 0.0002090 0.8716599
 Price of Labor (PL)  389 0.0272449 0.0271349 0.0002572 0.2358073
 Price of Physical capital (PK) 426 0.0614611 0.0542262 0.0004742 0.4475762
 Total Assets (TA)  426 536075.74 1424713.27 71.81 19554211.7
 Fixed Assets (FA)  426 25634.89 116143.67 5.6 1699595.17
 Equity (EQTY)  426 0.1782576 0.1769323 -1.6074231 0.7843552
 Deposits Mix (IBDP) 426 0.2729378 0.245072 4.88E-10 1
  Loans (LOAN)  426 0.4014255 0.1929195 2.35E-07 1.1885805
       
Slovenia  Interest Revenue (INTREV) 131 0.0856682 0.0328689 0.0089709 0.2162309
 Total Revenue (TOTREV) 131 0.1177629 0.0373638 0.0155458 0.2591529
 Price of Funds  (PF) 131 0.056242 0.025412 0.0198127 0.1501834
 Price of Labor (PL)  112 0.0193732 0.0067511 0.0054632 0.0406883
 Price of Physical capital (PK) 131 0.0298204 0.0191213 0.0084395 0.1025533
 Total Assets (TA)  131 564062.58 933643.62 17592.51 5244063.28
 Fixed Assets (FA)  131 24513.68 41533.17 187.32 212196.03
 Equity (EQTY)  131 0.1366259 0.0691497 -0.0529941 0.4991095
 Deposits Mix (IBDP) 131 0.1556617 0.1657697 3.24E-06 1
  Loans (LOAN)  131 0.5066049 0.1444886 0.0048384 0.8256065
       
Slovakia  Interest Revenue (INTREV) 115 0.0954714 0.0403634 0.0054802 0.2133931
 Total Revenue (TOTREV) 115 0.1207537 0.0529285 0.0098642 0.361596
 Price of Funds  (PF) 115 0.0848358 0.0473843 0.0089491 0.4192693
 Price of Labor (PL)  104 0.0095978 0.0056388 0.0023456 0.0475863
 Price of Physical capital (PK) 115 0.0284286 0.0404368 0.0022518 0.320461
 Total Assets (TA)  115 991733.12 1420788.34 15000 5430180.26
 Fixed Assets (FA)  115 44158.24 70313.22 902.96 289971.82
 Equity (EQTY)  115 0.1069959 0.1092515 -0.1949587 0.62
 Deposits Mix (IBDP) 115 0.3640954 0.2477856 0.0185828 1
  Loans (LOAN)  115 0.4438722 0.1643603 0.0005811 0.8084502
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  Table 4.2 Continued 
Yugoslavia  Interest Revenue (INTREV) 73 0.1018005 0.100024 0.0050578 0.5649241
 Total Revenue (TOTREV) 71 0.1939182 0.1580105 0.0037303 0.7605396
 Price of Funds  (PF) 73 0.0483621 0.0409877 0.0033989 0.2075782
 Price of Labor (PL)  0 . . . . 
 Price of Physical capital (PK) 73 0.0675853 0.0878039 0.0081322 0.6306913
 Total Assets (TA)  73 1242423.4 2139503.84 2154.4 12760732.6
 Fixed Assets (FA)  73 47485.82 76207.41 1 351048.71
 Equity (EQTY)  73 0.1808678 0.1624707 0.0087453 0.8390387
 Deposits Mix (IBDP) 73 0.3462069 0.37644 5.59E-10 1
  Loans (LOAN)  73 0.3426281 0.1785243 0.0430416 1
       
Bulgaria  Interest Revenue (INTREV) 117 0.1328481 0.1224951 0.0044486 0.6856187
 Total Revenue (TOTREV) 117 0.3344675 0.5729553 0 4.9417681
 Price of Funds  (PF) 117 0.1327697 0.169766 0.0030746 0.864
 Price of Labor (PL)  0 . . . . 
 Price of Physical capital (PK) 117 0.1727451 0.495705 0.000468275 4.2424964
 Total Assets (TA)  117 428927.17 1314979.27 7337.84 13061162.1
 Fixed Assets (FA)  117 11991.98 17522.81 1.52 90685.27
 Equity (EQTY)  117 0.1823892 0.1431709 -0.0468227 0.6449889
 Deposits Mix (IBDP) 117 0.2356406 0.2695131 2.39E-06 1
  Loans (LOAN)  117 0.3565919 0.1673489 0.0249323 0.7770796
1(Variables other than ratios are in 1000s of US dollars) 
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  Table 4.3    Number of Banks by Country and Year (1993-2000) 
 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Czech Republic 17 22 26 28 28 25 23 19
Estonia 1 2 8 10 10 4 4 4
Croatia 21 27 30 35 41 37 35 30
Hungary 18 21 26 27 28 26 30 28
Lithuania 2 3 5 7 10 9 9 8
Latvia 5 12 17 17 24 21 20 18
FYR of Macedonia 2 4 7 8 8 9 10 6
Poland 21 31 35 42 44 42 43 35
Romania  3 5 6 7 11 26 27 17
Russian Federation 22 44 67 67 69 56 80 52
Slovenia 7 10 16 17 25 20 20 20
Slovakia 7 10 14 19 21 20 18 14
Yugoslavia 5 11 13 14 10 10 10
Bulgaria 7 9 13 15 16 19 19 19
 Sample period 133 205 281 312 349 324 348 280
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  Table 4.4    Descriptive Statistics of Banks in Sample by Country Average for 1999 
 
 
Country 
 
N 
 
Assets  
 
Deposits  
Other 
Funding  
 
Equity  
 
Loans 
Investment 
Securities 
Czech Rep. 23 2080406.6 1624421.6 133993.74 181037.25 824995.62 1022069.07
Estonia 4 853797.76 596246.13 77872.34 117707.83 497291.66 247507.28
Croatia 35 371027.14 239724.81 47188.73 55213.97 197176.16 165395.22
Hungary 30 955514.74 747333.03 47471.45 82570.47 407301.88 458503.72
Lithuania 9 283078.5 233102.49 8186.64 29750.64 146475.77 71032.55
Latvia 20 153242.88 132194.78 1500.94 14950.45 69846.75 62257.78
FYR of Macedonia 10 97645.31 63878.15 496.53 16536.54 41953.39 47531.04
Poland 43 1912469.2 1630925.3 7222.85 172547.94 967080.4 779226.86
Romania  27 318874 252160.32 3128.1 48889.57 97394.2 170034.02
Russian Federation 80 535235.56 378220.24 14861.45 69694.85 228825.34 226358.92
Slovenia 20 687551.78 560575.39 24718.57 70852.66 377501.9 274026.27
Slovakia 18 846286.35 738380.42 11147.26 46441.51 484277.61 356381.25
All quantity variables are in thousands of US dollars and corrected for inflation. 
Total number of banks N = 319 for 1999.  
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  Table  5.1   Equilibrium Test  for CEE Banking Market for Individual Years and the Period 1993-2000 
  1993     1994     1995     1996     1997     1998     1999     2000     1993-2000     
Indep. Var. Coeff.  t  Coeff. t  Coeff. t  Coeff. t  Coeff. t  Coeff. t  Coeff. t  Coeff. t  Coeff. t  
PF -0.0097 -1.03  0.0004 0.14  -0.0106 -1.3  -0.0060 -1.4  -0.0236 -6.34 *** 0.0192 2.67 *** 0.0009 0.29  -0.0002 -0.07  -0.0113 -1.19
PL 0.0004 0.06  0.0006 -0.14  -0.0205 -1.97 * -0.0034 -0.7  -0.0024 -0.67  -0.0284 -3.91 *** -0.0011 -0.25  -0.0038 -1.27  -0.0138 -1.14
PK 0.0008 0.19  0.0009 0.34  0.0024 0.35  0.0002 0.1  0.0008 0.38  -0.0055 -1.24  -0.0006 -0.23  -0.0027 -1.47  0.0074 0.97
LNTA 0.0014 0.32  0.0032 1.31  0.0078 1.21  0.0083 2.7 *** 0.0043 2.29 ** 0.0055 1.31  0.0059 2.52 ** 0.0050 3.12 *** -0.8339 -120.9 ***
LNEQTY  0.0241 2.6 ** 0.0149 3.13 *** 0.0176 1.42  0.0199 3.2 *** 0.0108 2.62 *** 0.0200 2.58 ** 0.0053 1.45  0.0163 4.41 *** 0.1241 9.36 ***
LNLOAN -0.0017 -0.21  0.0033 0.81  -0.0226 -1.98 ** 0.0004 0.1  0.0070 1.93 * 0.0174 3.02 *** 0.0009 0.17  -0.0043 -1.28  -0.0194 -1.78 **
LNIBDP 0.0040 1.97 * -0.0018 -1.12  -0.0040 -1.26  -0.0016 -0.9  0.0019 1.29  0.0000 -0.02  -0.0007 -0.39  0.0004 0.4  -0.0025 -0.61
Czech Rep 0.0205 0.32  -0.0036 -0.12  -0.2166 -2.69 *** -0.1108 -2.6 ** -0.1026 -3.6 *** -0.1300 -1.96 * -0.0881 -2.28 ** -0.0441 -1.64  8.8809 89.26 ***
Estonia 0.0796 1.12  -0.0028 -0.08  -0.1693 -2.23 ** -0.0649 -1.7 * -0.0875 -3.09 *** -0.1149 -1.66 * -0.0625 -1.54  -0.0419 -1.55  9.0943 91.14 ***
Croatia 0.0678 1.35  -0.0163 -0.57  -0.2158 -2.93 *** -0.0897 -2.4 ** -0.0962 -3.7 *** -0.0756 -1.32  -0.0551 -1.7 * -0.0408 -1.75 * 8.9272 101.9 ***
Hungary 0.0083 0.13  0.0028 0.09  -0.1682 -2.17 ** -0.0815 -2.1 ** -0.0783 -2.86 *** -0.0909 -1.45  -0.0658 -1.85 * -0.0363 -1.47  8.9919 95.14 ***
Lithuania 0.0961 1.46  -0.0321 -0.86  -0.1588 -1.78 * -0.1482 -3.5 *** -0.1201 -4.49 *** -0.0461 -0.76  -0.0597 -1.76 * -0.0423 -1.78 * 9.0477 94.98 ***
Latvia 0.0516 0.81  -0.0037 -0.13  -0.3030 -4.33 *** -0.0716 -1.9 * -0.0778 -2.82 *** -0.0740 -1.28  -0.0657 -1.97 * -0.0265 -1.11  9.0880 100.3 ***
Macedonia 0.0407 0.6  0.0452 1.4  -0.1621 -2.12 ** -0.0572 -1.5  -0.0482 -1.8 * -0.0426 -0.71  -0.0351 -1.02  -0.0219 -0.87  9.0245 96.11 ***
Poland 0.0539 0.96  0.0201 0.67  -0.1731 -2.29 ** -0.0832 -2.1 ** -0.0644 -2.41 ** -0.0788 -1.3  -0.0582 -1.65  -0.0443 -1.83 * 9.1154 97.98 ***
Romania  0.0858 1.36  0.0266 0.84  -0.1100 -1.29  -0.0820 -2 ** 0.0090 0.35  -0.0512 -0.91  -0.0614 -1.9 * -0.0351 -1.58  9.1521 100.6 ***
Russia 0.0949 1.54  0.0543 1.82 * -0.1342 -1.84 * -0.0283 -0.8  -0.0706 -2.75 *** -0.1270 -2.43 ** -0.0395 -1.26  -0.0338 -1.47  9.1208 104.8 ***
Slovenia 0.0652 1.09  0.0126 0.4  -0.1852 -2.38 ** -0.0836 -2.1 ** -0.0916 -3.39 *** -0.0633 -1.02  -0.0580 -1.63  -0.0327 -1.34  8.9460 94.22 ***
Slovakia 0.0381 0.59  -0.0095 -0.31  -0.2044 -2.52 ** -0.0887 -2.2 ** -0.0887 -3.13 *** -0.0849 -1.31  -0.0547 -1.48  -0.0336 -1.31  8.8803 89.97 ***
Adjusted R2 0.27   0.39   0.1316   0.31   0.36   0.17   0.1089   0.2295   0.9636   
H - Statistic -0.008   0.001   -0.029   -0.009   -0.0252   -0.015   -0.0008   -0.0067   -0.018   
F-value for H=0 0.490 (0.48)  0.020 (0.87)  3.290 (0.17)  1.540 (0.21)  20.900 (0.001)  1.650 (0.2)  0.020 (0.89)  2.23 (0.13)  1.10 (0.29)  
# of observations 110   161   220   231   285   252   273   218   1729    
Estimated regression model:   ln (ROAit) = h1 ln(PFit)+h2 ln(PLit)+h3 ln(PKit)+β1 ln(TAit)+β2 ln(EQTYit)+β3 ln(LOANit)+β4 ln(IBDPit)+Σl=1 αl Dl +εit  
for t=1,…..,T where T is the number of periods observed, and i=1,….. ,I, where I is the total number of banks and ln is the natural logarithm.  The dependent variable is the logarithm of the return on asset ratio. 
Variables PF, PL and PK are the unit prices of three inputs: (PF) the ratio of interest expenses to deposits and other liabilities, (PL) the ratio of personnel expenses to deposits and loans, and (PK) the ratio of non-
interest expenses to fixed assets. Bank specific factors included in the model are total assets (TA), financial capital (EQTY), loans to total assets (LOAN), and interbank deposits to total assets (IBDP). The model is 
estimated by running Least-squares regressions on the pooled sample of fourteen CEE countries.  The models are adjusted to correct for first order serial correlation. The standard errors were calculated using 
White’s (1980) correction for heteroscedasticity. T-statistics are given in italics next to the parameter estimates. For  t-values ***,**, and * indicate 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. The H 
statistic is equal to the sum of the elasticities of the interest revenue with respect to three input prices: H =  h1 + h2 + h3 .  The Wald test is used to test the H=0 hypothesis and follows an F-distribution.  The values in 
parenthesis for the Wald tests are the levels of significance where the null hypothesis can be rejected. 
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  Table 5.2  Regression Results of Competitive Conditions for CEE banks: Panel data covering the period  1993-2000  
  Model 1a (INTR)    Model 1b (TOTREV)     Model 2a (INTR)   Model 2b (TOTREV)  
Independent Variable  Est. Coeff. t  Est. Coeff. t   Est. Coeff. t Est. Coeff. t
PF 0.3515 27.5 *** 0.2805 27.48 ***  0.4093 37.66 *** 0.3291 31.63 ***
PL 0.2038 14.6 *** 0.1938 14.57 ***       
PK  (PO in Models 2a,2b) 0.0301 3.42 *** 0.0301 3.42 ***  0.1465 3.45 *** 0.2184 9.31 ***
LNTA 0.0150 1.9 * 0.0150 1.9 *  0.0122 1.55 ** 0.0450 5.59 ***
LNEQTY  -0.070 -4.66 *** -0.070 -4.66 ***  -0.0550 -3.60 *** -0.0267 -1.72 * 
LNLOAN 0.1547 12.3 *** 0.1547 12.26 ***  0.1543 11.82 *** 0.1118 8.41 ***
LNIBDP -0.0097 -2.05 ** -0.0097 -2.05 **  -0.0122 -2.67 *** -0.0127 -2.62 ***
Czech Republic -0.8958 -7.83 *** -0.8958 -7.83 ***  -1.2318 -11.65 *** -0.6244 -5.80 ***
Estonia -1.0640 -9.26 *** -1.0640 -9.26 ***  -1.1673 -10.18 *** -0.5103 -4.37 ***
Croatia -0.9762 -9.69 *** -0.9762 -9.69 ***  -1.1309 -11.85 *** -0.5097 -5.24 ***
Hungary -0.8612 -7.94 *** -0.8612 -7.94 ***  -1.0927 -10.75 *** -0.5485 -5.30 ***
Lithuania -1.2261 -11.2 *** -1.2261 -11.21 ***  -1.3246 -12.14 *** -0.6181 -5.56 ***
Latvia -0.9420 -9.14 *** -0.9420 -9.14 ***  -1.1036 -11.23 *** -0.4058 -4.05 ***
Macedonia -0.7026 -6.49 *** -0.7026 -6.49 ***  -0.8932 -8.53 *** 0.1018 0.96  
Poland -0.7139 -6.69 *** -0.7139 -6.69 ***  -0.9195 -9.22 *** -0.2948 -2.90 ***
Romania  -0.3511 -3.37 *** -0.3511 -3.37 ***  -0.5987 -5.96 *** -0.0652 -0.64  
Russia -0.7304 -7.31 *** -0.7304 -7.31 ***  -1.0235 -10.98 *** -0.2580 -2.71 ***
Slovenia -1.0369 -9.52 *** -1.0369 -9.52 ***  -1.2355 -11.97 *** -0.623 -5.93 ***
Slovakia -0.9814 -8.66 *** -0.9814 -8.66 ***  -1.3131 -12.51 *** -0.7231 -6.76 ***
Yugoslavia     -1.2180 -10.63 *** -0.3056 -2.61 ***
Bulgaria     -1.0625 -10.6 *** -0.2153 -2.10 ** 
H - Statistic 0.586  0.5046    0.5558   0.5475   
aF-value on Wald test for H=0 758.31*  687.77*    1010.5*   945.85*   
bF-value on Wald test for H=1 570.05*  883.26*    1843.09*   1818.5*   
Adjusted R2 0.968  0.9636    0.9624   0.9455   
# of observations 1769    1764       2113     2105     
Estimated regression model:   ln (REVit) = h1 ln(PFit)+h2 ln(PLit)+h3 ln(PKit)+β1 ln(TAit)+β2 ln(EQTYit)+β3 ln(LOANit)+β4 ln(IBDPit)+Σl=1 αl Dl +εit    
for t=1,…..,T where T is the number of periods observed, and i=1,….. ,I, where I is the total number of banks and ln is the natural logarithm.  The dependent variable is the logarithm of the 
total interest revenue (or total operating revenue) scaled by total assets. Variables PF, PL and PK are the unit prices of three inputs: (PF) the ratio of interest expenses to deposits and other 
liabilities, (PL) the ratio of personnel expenses to deposits and loans, and (PK) the ratio of non-interest expenses to fixed assets. Bank specific factors included in the model are total assets 
(TA), financial capital (EQTY), loans to total assets (LOAN), and interbank deposits to total assets (IBDP). The model is estimated by running Least-squares regressions on the pooled 
sample of fourteen CEE countries. The models are adjusted to correct for first order serial correlation. The standard errors were calculated using White’s (1980) correction for 
heteroscedasticity. T-statistics are given in italics next to the parameter estimates. For  t-values ***,**, and * indicate 1,5 , and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. The H statistic is 
equal to the sum of the elasticities of the interest revenue with respect to three input prices: H =  h1 + h2 + h3 . The Wald test is used to test the H=0 and H=1 hypothesis. aF statistic for testing 
hypothesis H=0 (* means significantly different from 1 at the 5% level). bF statistic for testing hypothesis H=1 (* means significantly different from 0 at the 5% level).  
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  Table 5.3   Empirical Results from Model 1a 1993-2000  (Fixed and Random effects)   
  Model 1a-fixed one Model 1a-fixed two  Model 1a random one Model 1a random two  
Independent Variable  INTR     t  INTR      t  INTR     t  INTR      t 
PF 0.2731 22.99 *** 0.2619 22.84 *** 0.2781 26.22 *** 0.2622 25.71 *** 
PL 0.1584 7.11 *** 0.2127 9.61 *** 0.1701 9.27 *** 0.2082 10.76 *** 
PK 0.0323 2.61 *** 0.0124 1.03  0.0324 3.03 *** 0.0133 1.24  
LNTA 0.0204 0.78  0.1110 3.93 *** -0.0084 -0.40  0.0996 4.11 *** 
LNEQTY  -0.0111 -0.45  -0.029 -1.22  -0.0203 -0.92  -0.0299 -1.4  
LNLOAN 0.1389 8.17 *** 0.1484 9.07 *** 0.1384 9.41 *** 0.1494 10.3 *** 
LNIBDP -0.0153 -2.46 ** -0.0143 -2.4 ** -0.0136 -2.53 ** -0.0138 -2.62 *** 
Czech Republic      -0.6853 -2.52 ** -2.0058 -2.69 *** 
Estonia      -0.8581 -2.95 *** -2.0031 -2.44 *** 
Croatia      -0.8218 -3.24 *** -1.9678 -2.73 *** 
Hungary      -0.6596 -2.39 *** -1.9147 -2.51 *** 
Lithuania      -1.0358 -3.65 *** -2.1203 -2.62 *** 
Latvia      -0.7894 -3.03 *** -1.7902 -2.4 ** 
Macedonia      -0.6158 -2.04 ** -1.6385 -1.91 * 
Poland      -0.4782 -1.82 * -1.7904 -2.47 ** 
Romania       -0.1580 -0.59  -1.2236 -1.61 ** 
Russia      -0.5527 -2.23 ** -1.6636 -2.39 ** 
Slovenia      -0.8344 -2.95 *** -2.0654 -2.63 *** 
Slovakia      -0.8283 -2.96 *** -2.0625 -2.66 *** 
H 0.464  0.487   0.481   0.484  
aF-value on Wald test for H=0 319.45*  376.23*   471.8*   478.44*  
bF-value on Wald test for H=1 426.3*  416.82*   550.40*   543.81*  
Adjusted R2 0.9827  0.9842   0.7887   0.3637  
# of observations 1369    1374     1740     1740    
Estimated regression model:   ln (REVit) = h1 ln(PFit)+h2 ln(PLit)+h3 ln(PKit)+β1 ln(TAit)+β2 ln(EQTYit)+β3 ln(LOANit)+β4 ln(IBDPit)+Σl=1 αl Dl +εit 
for t=1,…..,T where T is the number of periods observed, and i=1,….. ,I, where I is the total number of banks and ln is the natural logarithm.  The dependent variable is the logarithm of 
the total interest revenue (or total operating revenue) scaled by total assets. Variables PF, PL and PK are the unit prices of three inputs: (PF) the ratio of interest expenses to deposits and 
other liabilities, (PL) the ratio of personnel expenses to deposits and loans, and (PK) the ratio of non-interest expenses to fixed assets. Bank specific factors included in the model are total 
assets (TA), financial capital (EQTY), loans to total assets (LOAN), and interbank deposits to total assets (IBDP). Specifications tested on the pooled sample of fourteen CEE countries 
are fixed and random effects models with and without year dummies. T-statistics are given in italics next to the parameter estimates. For  t-values ***,**, and * indicate 1,5 , and 10 
percent significance levels, respectively. The H statistic is equal to the sum of the elasticities of the interest revenue with respect to three input prices: H =  h1 + h2 + h3 . The Wald test is 
used to test the H=0 and H=1 hypothesis. aF statistic for testing hypothesis H=0 (* means significantly different from 1 at the 5% level). bF statistic for testing hypothesis H=1 (* means 
significantly different from 0 at the 5% level). 
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  Table  5.4   H Statistics for Years and Size Groups1  
  Model 1a  (INTREV) Model 2a  (INTREV) 
   H F   DOF   H F   DOF   
Panel A           
1993-2000  0.5865 758.31a* 1769  0.5558 1010.5a* 2113  
   570.5b*    1843.09b*   
1993-1996  0.5400 268.73a* 741  0.5214 419.87a* 909  
   211.28b*    415.19b*   
1997-2000  0.5917 478.35a* 1028  0.5517 659.90a* 1204  
     471.60b*       600.54b*    
Panel B           
Large Banks  0.7248 934.42a* 907  0.7131 1722.06a* 1056  
   134.66b*    278.54b*   
Small Banks  0.5647 357.84a* 862  0.4580 353.07a* 1057  
     212.5b*       494.29b*    
Panel C           
1993  0.6548 83.29a* 110  0.6939 122.49a* 122  
   23.14b*    26.10b*   
1994  0.4982 76.60a* 161  0.6127 219.59a* 185  
   77.68b*    87.73b*   
1995  0.4354 47.911a* 220  0.4643 84.85a* 268  
   80.53b*    112.96b*   
1996  0.4085 42.56a* 250  0.3627 53.58a* 294  
   89.23b*    165.0b*   
1997  0.5404 128.4a* 285  0.5323 189.4a* 337  
   93.1b*    146.22b*   
1998  0.6952 321.38a* 252  0.6545 316.39a* 303  
   47.24b*    67.18b*   
1999  0.5542 82.18a* 273  0.5636 86.66a* 332  
   178.5b*    223.66b*   
2000  0.5740 104.39a* 218  0.5534 128.21a* 272  
   12853b*    135.09b*   
1 Note: See table 5.1 for the definition of estimated regression model.  
DOF: Degrees of freedom.  
The H statistic is equal to the sum of the elasticities of the interest revenue with respect to three input prices:  
H =  h1 + h2 + h3 .  
The Wald test is used to test the H=0 and H=1 hypothesis. aF statistic for testing hypothesis H=0 (* means 
significantly different from 1 at the 5% level). bF statistic for testing hypothesis H=1 (* means significantly 
different from 0 at the 5% level).  
Large and small banks are determined by total assets above and below the median asset size in the sample. 
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  Table 5.5    H-Statistics for Individual Countries 1993-20001 
  
    Model – 1a (INTREV)      Model – 1b (TOTREV)   
Country  H-statistic 
F-Value for 
H=0 
F-Value for 
H=1 N 
Adj.  
R-Square H-Statistic
F-Value 
for H=0 
F-Value 
for H=1 N 
Adj.  
R-Square 
           
The Czech Rep. 0.5171 144 125.59 160 0.73 0.4294 72.35 127.86 160 0.56 
Estonia 0.7018 22.16 8.23 27 0.85 0.3438 16.04 6.73 27 0.75 
Croatia 0.7419 134.85 16.33 235 0.77 0.6984 165.52 30.89 235 0.81 
Hungary 0.3629 51.44 158.58 132 0.67 0.4095 62.88 130.86 132 0.67 
Lithuania 0.4449 7.14 13.11 31 0.83 0.3744 7.17 20.03 31 0.82 
Latvia 0.7552 63.48 5.67 104 0.65 0.6194 47.58 17.95 103 0.59 
FYR of Macedonia 0.1809 1.27* 39.06 34 0.86 0.3868 3.95* 13.63 34 0.69 
Poland 0.5074 221.43 337.6 243 0.7 0.4968 367.13 442.07 243 0.76 
Romania 0.5381 137.27 93.36 66 0.89 0.5184 178.16 51.41 66 0.91 
The Russian Fed. 0.6449 226.87 68.73 361 0.68 0.5570 255.36 161.42 357 0.69 
Slovenia 0.5760 41.45 22.45 96 0.89 0.52751 14.56 11.68 96 0.59 
Slovakia 0.0987 0.09 * 30.15 88 0.38 0.6364 31.27 10.21 88 0.6 
Yugoslavia2 0.7055 37.69 6.31 56 0.8207 0.6762 38.93 7.97 54 0.847 
Bulgaria2 0.6076 139.99 54.01 79 0.7968 0.6693 110.16 29.89 77 0.8448 
1Note: See table 5.1 for the definition of estimated regression model 
2 For Yugoslavia and Bulgaria the estimated models are Model-2a and Model-2B.  
The Wald test is used to test H= 0 and H=1 hypotheses. 
 * Means can not reject the hypothesis H=0 at 5% significant level (Monopoly) 
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Table 5.6     Empirical Results for the Czech Republic 
 
   Model 1a      Model 1b   
Variable Estimate t-values     Estimate t-values   
Intercept -1.80290 -6.7 *  -1.56280 -4.99 * 
PF 0.40960 14.08 *  0.29850 8.71 * 
PL 0.10360 3.67 *  0.11650 3.54 * 
PK 0.00396 0.25   0.01440 0.77   
LNTA 0.04820 3.06 *  0.03250 1.79  
LNEQTY -0.02660 -0.94   -0.01090 -0.33   
LNLOAN 0.03870 1.6   0.03120 1.11   
LNIBDP -0.00978 -0.86   -0.00463 -0.35   
1993 0.27020 3.52 *  0.22930 2.53   
1994 0.26200 3.44 *  0.22290 2.49 ** 
1995 0.25650 3.47 *  0.22830 2.63 * 
1996 0.20180 2.62 *  0.26250 2.9 * 
1997 0.20180 2.55 *  0.28320 3.05 * 
1998 0.33130 4.47 *  0.32580 3.73 * 
1999 0.16310 2.46 **   0.20550 2.6 * 
H 0.51716   0.42940  
H=0 144 (0.001)   72.35 (0.001)  
H=1 125.59 (0.001)   127.86 (0.001)  
N 160   160  
Adj. R-Square 0.73      0.56    
 
Note: See table 5.2 for the definition of estimated regression model.  
The Wald test is used to test H= 0 and H=1 hypotheses and F-values for the two 
hypotheses are provided in the second column.  The values in parenthesis for the Wald 
tests are the levels of significance where the null hypothesis can be rejected.  
 *, ** represent significance levels at 1% and 5% respectively.  
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Table 5.7 Empirical Results for Estonia   
  
   Model 1a      Model 1b   
Variable Estimate t-values     Estimate t-values   
Intercept -0.59890 -1.36    -1.52860 -3.23 * 
PF 0.53150 4.7 *  -0.03930 -0.29 * 
PL 0.20780 2.87 *  0.34810 4.7 * 
PK -0.03750 -0.77    0.03500 0.65   
LNTA 0.03920 1.1    0.02140 0.54   
LNEQTY -0.03240 -0.52    -0.10530 -1.39   
LNLOAN 0.36700 2.48 **  0.06170 0.34   
LNIBDP -0.02790 -1.34    -0.01350 -0.48   
1993 0.53940 2.28 **  0.59340 2.1 ** 
1994 0.55970 2.98 *  0.26290 1.17   
1995 0.32230 3.34 *  0.06120 0.52   
1996 0.23840 2.77 *  0.04370 0.42   
1997 0.12900 1.51    0.01790 0.18   
1998 0.07310 0.78    -0.12290 -1.06   
1999 0.04560 0.56     0.14630 1.33   
H 0.70180   0.34380   
H=0 22.16 (0.001)   16.04 (0.001)  
H=1 8.23 (0.018)   6.73 (0.0231)  
N 27   27   
Adj. R-Square 0.85      0.75     
Note: See table 5.2 for the definition of estimated regression model.  
The Wald test is used to test H= 0 and H=1 hypotheses and F-values for the two 
hypotheses are provided in the second column.  The values in parenthesis for the 
Wald tests are the levels of significance where the null hypothesis can be rejected.  
*, ** represent significance levels at 1% and 5% respectively.   
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Table 5.8 Empirical Results for Croatia 
 
 Model 1a    Model 1b 
Variable Estimate t-values     Estimate t-values   
Intercept -0.13550 -0.49    0.48430 1.97 ** 
PF 0.45220 11.41 *  0.40850 12.18 * 
PL 0.27420 6.5 *  0.27150 7.45 * 
PK 0.01550 0.55    0.01840 0.77   
LNTA 0.01280 0.5    -0.00913 -0.4   
LNEQTY -0.00304 -0.07    0.05510 1.45   
LNLOAN 0.06880 1.5    0.10730 2.7 * 
LNIBDP 0.01540 1.52    0.02740 3.17 * 
1993 0.50920 4.17 *  0.55750 5.46 * 
1994 -0.27440 -3.18 *  -0.10580 -1.46   
1995 -0.00579 -0.07    0.06430 0.93   
1996 -0.01040 -0.13    0.07100 1.09   
1997 -0.04390 -0.58    -0.02270 -0.36   
1998 0.02690 0.35    0.03240 0.51   
1999 0.04430 0.65     0.00819 0.15   
H 0.7419   0.6983   
H=0 134.85 (0.001)   165.52 (0.001)  
H=1 16.33 (0.001)   30.89 (0.001)  
N 235   235   
Adj. R-Square 0.77      0.81     
Note: See table 5.2 for the definition of estimated regression model.  
The Wald test is used to test H= 0 and H=1 hypotheses and F-values for the 
two hypotheses are provided in the second column.   
The values in parenthesis for the Wald tests are the levels of significance 
where the null hypothesis can be rejected.  
 *, ** represent significance levels at 1% and 5% respectively.  
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Table 5.9 Empirical Results for Hungary 
 
 Model 1a    Model 1b 
Variable Estimate t-values   Estimate t-values  
Intercept -0.13550 -0.49   0.48430 1.97 ** 
PF 0.45220 11.41 *  0.40850 12.18 * 
PL 0.27420 6.5 *  0.27150 7.45 * 
PK 0.01550 0.55   0.01840 0.77  
LNTA 0.01280 0.5   -0.00913 -0.4  
LNEQTY -0.00304 -0.07   0.05510 1.45  
LNLOAN 0.06880 1.5   0.10730 2.7 * 
LNIBDP 0.01540 1.52   0.02740 3.17 * 
1993 0.50920 4.17 *  0.55750 5.46 * 
1994 -0.27440 -3.18 *  -0.10580 -1.46  
1995 -0.00579 -0.07   0.06430 0.93  
1996 -0.01040 -0.13   0.07100 1.09  
1997 -0.04390 -0.58   -0.02270 -0.36  
1998 0.02690 0.35   0.03240 0.51  
1999 0.04430 0.65   0.00819 0.15  
H 0.7419    0.6983   
H=0 134.85 (0.001)   165.52 (0.001)  
H=1 16.33 (0.001)   30.89 (0.001)  
N 235    235   
Adj. R-Square 0.77    0.81   
Note: See table 5.2 for the definition of estimated regression model.  
The Wald test is used to test H= 0 and H=1 hypotheses and F-values for the two 
hypotheses are provided in the second column.  The values in parenthesis for the 
Wald tests are the levels of significance where the null hypothesis can be 
rejected.   
*, ** represent significance levels at 1% and 5% respectively.   
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Table 5.10   Empirical Results for Lithuania 
 
 Model 1a    Model 1b 
Variable Estimate t-values   Estimate t-values  
Intercept -1.78550 -3.1 **  -0.99080 -2.17 **
PF 0.07230 2.55 **  0.03590 1.38  
PL 0.36110 2.44 **  0.48180 4.03 * 
PK 0.01150 0.12   -0.14330 -1.76  
LNTA 0.08540 1.88   0.06730 1.82  
LNEQTY -0.03400 -0.55   -0.03350 -0.59  
LNLOAN 0.50030 3.35 *  0.48180 3.85 * 
LNIBDP 0.02820 0.44   0.03160 0.59  
1993 1.15700 4.07 *  1.40070 5.42 * 
1994 0.73680 2.76 *  0.56250 2.33 **
1995 0.06540 0.3   -0.00920 -0.05  
1996 -0.15960 -1.01   -0.23980 -1.66  
1997 -0.11740 -0.97   -0.16180 -1.48  
1998 -0.13660 -1.12   -0.14470 -1.31  
1999 -0.09890 -0.87   -0.15480 -1.41  
H 0.4449   0.3744   
H=0 7.14 (0.011)   7.17 (0.0113)  
H=1 13.11 (0.001)   20.03 (0.001)  
N 31    31   
Adj. R-Square 0.83    0.82   
Note: See table 5.2 for the definition of estimated regression model.  
The Wald test is used to test H= 0 and H=1 hypotheses and F-values for the two 
hypotheses are provided in the second column.  The values in parenthesis for the 
Wald tests are the levels of significance where the null hypothesis can be rejected.  
*, ** represent significance levels at 1% and 5% respectively.   
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Table 5.11 Empirical Results for Latvia 
 
 Model 1a    Model 1b 
Variable Estimate t-values     Estimate t-values   
Intercept -1.09930 -2.42 **  -1.44850 -3.21 * 
PF 0.38820 5.69 *  0.31720 4.86 * 
PL 0.24550 4.63 *  0.17410 3.44 * 
PK 0.12150 2.54 **  0.12810 2.72 * 
LNTA 0.06830 1.7    0.09960 2.49 * 
LNEQTY 0.03120 0.48    0.12370 1.99 ** 
LNLOAN 0.05150 1    -0.05420 -1.08   
LNIBDP -0.00339 -0.31    -0.00557 -0.53   
1993 0.52190 2.54 **  0.81110 4.22 * 
1994 0.26250 1.7 **  0.40580 2.78 * 
1995 0.28840 2.15 *  0.41070 3.22 * 
1996 0.21760 1.7 **  0.33450 2.75 * 
1997 0.01960 0.17    0.24590 2.25 ** 
1998 0.17240 1.45    -0.05540 -0.49   
1999 -0.00203 -0.02     0.06070 0.62   
H 0.7552   0.6194   
H=0 63.48 (0.001)   47.58 (0.001)  
H=1 5.67 (0.0192)   17.95 (0.001)  
N 104   103   
Adj. R-
Square 
0.65      0.59     
Note: See table 5.2 for the definition of estimated regression model.  
The Wald test is used to test H= 0 and H=1 hypotheses and F-values for the two 
hypotheses are provided in the second column.  The values in parenthesis for the 
Wald tests are the levels of significance where the null hypothesis can be rejected.  
*, ** represent significance levels at 1% and 5% respectively.   
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Table 5.12 Empirical Results for FYR of Macedonia 
 
 Model 1a    Model 1b 
Variable Estimate t-values     Estimate t-values   
Intercept -2.76620 -3.76 *  2.06460 2.01 ** 
PF 0.11890 2.01 **  -0.08680 -1.05   
PL 0.02960 0.27    0.53430 3.56 * 
PK 0.03240 0.66    -0.06070 -0.87   
LNTA 0.08420 1.49    -0.24720 -3.16 * 
LNEQTY -0.00993 -0.09    -0.45940 -2.84 * 
LNLOAN 0.44420 4.92 *  0.17830 1.39   
LNIBDP -0.11050 -4.26 *  -0.05810 -1.58  
1993 0.40830 1.64 *  0.89310 2.48 * 
1994 0.71720 3.68 *  0.48890 1.75   
1995 0.36570 2.41 **  0.23100 1.07   
1996 0.29930 2.16 **  0.23530 1.2   
1997 0.07150 0.52    0.53000 2.72 * 
1998 -0.07650 -0.58    0.19060 1.01   
1999 0.00769 0.06     0.04880 0.28   
H 0.18091   0.38685   
H=0 1.27 (0.2672)   3.95 (0.0549
) 
 
H=1 39.06 (0.001)   13.63 (0.001)  
N 34   34   
Adj. R-
Square 
0.86      0.69     
Note: See table 5.2 for the definition of estimated regression model.  
The Wald test is used to test H= 0 and H=1 hypotheses and F-values for the two 
hypotheses are provided in the second column.  The values in parenthesis for the 
Wald tests are the levels of significance where the null hypothesis can be rejected.  
*, ** represent significance levels at 1% and 5% respectively.   
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Table  5.13 Empirical Results for Poland 
 
 Model 1a    Model 1b 
Variable Estimate t-values     Estimate t-values   
Intercept -0.68130 -3.68 *  -0.54620 -4.19 * 
PF 0.36890 13.63 *  0.38090 18.36 * 
PL 0.13500 4.83 *  0.09670 4.47 * 
PK 0.00356 0.41    0.01920 2.83 * 
LNTA -0.01830 -1.33    -0.00434 -0.47   
LNEQTY -0.04080 -1.43    0.00044 0.02   
LNLOAN 0.07110 4.74 *  0.08550 7.41 * 
LNIBDP -0.01660 -1.5    -0.01860 -2.23 ** 
1993 0.09390 1.72    0.15210 3.32 * 
1994 0.19590 3.76 *  0.20770 4.92 * 
1995 0.10260 2.05 **  0.08720 2.17 ** 
1996 0.09970 2.12 **  0.04010 1.06   
1997 0.07010 1.6    0.02680 0.74   
1998 0.06460 1.54    0.01890 0.53   
1999 -0.08920 -2.44 **   -0.04880 -1.45   
H 0.50746   0.49680   
H=0 221.43 (0.001)   367.13 (0.001)  
H=1 337.6 (0.001)   442.07 (0.001)  
N 243   243   
Adj. R-
Square 
0.7      0.76     
Note: See table 5.2 for the definition of estimated regression model.  
The Wald test is used to test H= 0 and H=1 hypotheses and F-values for the two 
hypotheses are provided in the second column.  The values in parenthesis for the 
Wald tests are the levels of significance where the null hypothesis can be rejected.   
*, ** represent significance levels at 1% and 5% respectively.   
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Table  5.14 Empirical Results for Romania 
 
 Model 1a    Model 1b 
Variable Estimate t-values     Estimate t-values   
Intercept -0.36400 -1.16    0.07630 0.28   
PF 0.33320 12.81 *  0.29510 12.16 * 
PL 0.14190 2.22 **  0.12550 4.16 * 
PK 0.06300 1.7    0.09780 3.11 ** 
LNTA 0.06640 2.54 **  0.06950 3.05 * 
LNEQTY 0.03490 0.68    0.06260 1.41   
LNLOAN 0.05790 1.95 **  0.09840 3.88 * 
LNIBDP -0.00605 -0.43    0.01740 1.47   
1993 0.24900 1.61    0.09990 0.77   
1994 0.03490 0.26    -0.11580 -1.02   
1995 0.03390 0.25    0.07220 0.64   
1996 -0.08800 -0.71    -0.12280 -1.19   
1997 0.10700 1.07    0.17080 2.06   
1998 0.07950 0.97    0.04120 0.62   
1999 0.02850 0.39     -0.00031 -0.01   
H 0.53810   0.51840   
H=0 137.27 (0.001)   178.16 (0.001)  
H=1 93.36 (0.001)   51.41 (0.001)  
N 66   66   
Adj. R-
Square 
0.89      0.91     
Note: See table 5.2 for the definition of estimated regression model.  
The Wald test is used to test H= 0 and H=1 hypotheses and F-values for the two 
hypotheses are provided in the second column.  The values in parenthesis for the 
Wald tests are the levels of significance where the null hypothesis can be rejected.   
*, ** represent significance levels at 1% and 5% respectively.   
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Table  5.15   Empirical Results for the Russian Federation 
 
 Model 1a    Model 1b 
Variable Estimate t-values     Estimate t-values   
Intercept -0.03900 -0.16    0.63300 3.37 * 
PF 0.43560 14.04 *  0.32870 13.22 * 
PL 0.18830 8.36 *  0.15630 8.81 * 
PK 0.02110 1    0.07210 4.3 * 
LNTA -0.01910 -1.05    -0.07510 -5.36 * 
LNEQTY -0.00442 -0.13    0.05370 1.98 **
LNLOAN 0.17750 4.86 *  0.01160 0.39   
LNIBDP -0.01080 -1.19    -0.01280 -1.56   
1993 0.30430 2.46 *  0.14780 1.46   
1994 0.39270 3.58 *  0.25820 2.91 * 
1995 0.30860 3.21 *  0.39260 5.01 * 
1996 0.26210 3.03 *  0.41560 5.86 * 
1997 0.11500 1.46    0.18930 2.92 * 
1998 -0.16040 -1.89 **  -0.18520 -2.61 * 
1999 -0.05390 -0.78     0.10720 1.84   
H 0.64499   0.55708  
H=0 226.87 (0.001)   255.36 (0.001)  
H=1 68.73 (0.001)   161.42 (0.001)  
N 361   357  
Adj. R-
Square 
0.68      0.69    
Note: See table 5.2 for the definition of estimated regression model.  
The Wald test is used to test H= 0 and H=1 hypotheses and F-values for the two 
hypotheses are provided in the second column.  The values in parenthesis for the Wald 
tests are the levels of significance where the null hypothesis can be rejected.   
*, ** represent significance levels at 1% and 5% respectively.   
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Table 5.16 Empirical Results for Slovenia  
 
 Model 1a    Model 1b 
Variable Estimate t-values     Estimate t-values   
Intercept -2.58850 -6.66 *  -1.15320 -2.03 **
PF 0.42780 7.09 *  0.31050 3.47 * 
PL 0.06340 1.1    0.16520 1.93 **
PK 0.08490 3.64 *  0.05180 1.48   
LNTA 0.14290 6.14 *  0.08250 2.42 * 
LNEQTY 0.01660 0.3    0.13000 1.63   
LNLOAN 0.35660 12.9 *  0.24000 5.28 * 
LNIBDP -0.01110 -1.31    0.03790 2.93 * 
1993 0.58190 6.56 *  0.18670 1.33   
1994 0.22380 2.96 *  0.23660 1.97 **
1995 0.01800 0.33    0.06630 0.75   
1996 0.12710 2.3 **  0.10080 1.14   
1997 0.10370 1.99 **  0.07880 0.94   
1998 -0.00078 -0.02    0.01960 0.24   
1999 -0.07630 -1.86     -0.05770 -0.81   
H 0.57607   0.52751  
H=0 41.45 (0.001)   14.56 (0.001)  
H=1 22.45 (0.001)   11.68 (0.001)  
N 96   96  
Adj. R-
Square 
0.89      0.59    
Note: See table 5.2 for the definition of estimated regression model.  
The Wald test is used to test H= 0 and H=1 hypotheses and F-values for the two 
hypotheses are provided in the second column.  The values in parenthesis for the 
Wald tests are the levels of significance where the null hypothesis can be rejected.   
*, ** represent significance levels at 1% and 5% respectively.   
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Table  5.17 Empirical Results for Slovakia  
 
 Model 1a    Model 1b 
Variable Estimate t-values     Estimate t-values   
Intercept -3.96880 -4.13 *  -1.50030 -2.16 **
PF 0.09380 2.44 *  0.04550 1.72 * 
PL 0.01070 0.08    0.35540 3.85 * 
PK -0.00565 -0.07    0.23560 4.09 * 
LNTA 0.15770 2.43 *  0.10210 2.14 **
LNEQTY -0.01170 -0.18    -0.00537 -0.12   
LNLOAN 0.15100 2.18 **  0.27180 5.74 * 
LNIBDP 0.03780 0.67    -0.07140 -1.75   
1993 0.00449 0.02    0.22390 1.2   
1994 -0.09160 -0.36    -0.04420 -0.25   
1995 -0.39660 -1.72    -0.23700 -1.49   
1996 -0.35820 -1.62     -0.08900 -0.58    
1997 -0.05120 -0.24    0.16950 1.16   
1998 0.09070 0.42    0.24470 1.67   
1999 0.04010 0.2     0.07520 0.58   
H 0.098796   0.63642   
H=0 0.09 (0.7625)   31.27 (0.001)  
H=1 30.15 (0.001)   10.21 (0.001)  
N 88   88   
Adj. R-
Square 
0.38      0.6     
Note: See table 5.2 for the definition of estimated regression model.  
The Wald test is used to test H= 0 and H=1 hypotheses and F-values for the two 
hypotheses are provided in the second column.  The values in parenthesis for the 
Wald tests are the levels of significance where the null hypothesis can be 
rejected.  
 *, ** represent significance levels at 1% and 5% respectively.   
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Table  5.18 Empirical Results for Yugoslavia 
 
 Model 2a    Model 2b 
Variable Estimate t-values     Estimate t-values   
Intercept -0.2426 -0.43    0.7118 1.27   
PF 0.5251 5.49 *  0.2291 2.45 ** 
PO 0.1804 2.03 **  0.4118 5.62 * 
LNTA 0.2738 2.95 *  0.5421 5.89 * 
LNEQTY 0.0915 0.85    -0.1586 -1.44   
LNLOAN -0.005719 -0.42    -0.008045 -0.52   
LNIBDP 0.2266 0.81    0.9798 3.59 * 
1993 0.401 1.98    0.4738 2.38 ** 
1994 0.8638 4.32 *  0.3141 1.64   
1995 0.6152 3.29 *  0.0946 0.53   
1996 0.2688 1.37    0.1464 0.78   
1997 0.2647 1.37     -0.1247 -0.68   
1998 -0.2426 -0.43    0.7118 1.27  
1999 0.5251 5.49 *   0.2291 2.45  
H 0.70552   0.6762   
H=0 37.69 (0.001)     38.93 (0.001)  
H=1 6.31 (0.015)   7.97 (0.0011)   
N 56   54    
Adj. R-
Square 
0.8207   0.847  ** 
Note: See table 5.2 for the definition of estimated regression model.  
The Wald test is used to test H= 0 and H=1 hypotheses and F-values for the two 
hypotheses are provided in the second column.  The values in parenthesis for the 
Wald tests are the levels of significance where the null hypothesis can be 
rejected.   
*, ** represent significance levels at 1% and 5% respectively.   
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Table 5.19 Empirical Results for Bulgaria 
 
 Model 2a    Model 2b 
Variable Estimate t-values     Estimate t-values   
Intercept -0.662 -1.97 **  0.2121 0.58   
PF 0.5185 10.7 *  0.1737 3 * 
PO 0.0892 1.97 **  0.4956 8.83 * 
LNTA -0.0296 -0.63    -0.0357 -0.61   
LNEQTY 0.0394 0.55    -0.0853 -1.04   
LNLOAN 0.0263 1.49    0.006463 0.31   
LNIBDP 0.4999 1.1    2.8328 4.86 * 
1993 -0.1335 -0.44    1.5641 4.06 * 
1994 -0.3977 -2.18 **  0.6153 2.48 ** 
1995 -0.2979 -2.05 **  1.1497 6.39 * 
1996 -0.1433 -1.05    0.743 4.35 * 
1997 -0.2714 -2.48 **  -0.2315 -1.63   
1998 -0.0867 -0.84     -0.0465 -0.31   
1999 -0.662 -1.97 **   0.2121 0.58  
H 0.6076      0.6693    
H=0 139.99 (0.001)   110.16 (0.001)  
H=1 54.01 (0.001)   29.89 (0.001)  
N 79   77    
Adj. R-
Square 
0.7968   0.8448    
Note: See table 5.2 for the definition of estimated regression model.  
The Wald test is used to test H= 0 and H=1 hypotheses and F-values for the two 
hypotheses are provided in the second column.  The values in parenthesis for the 
Wald tests are the levels of significance where the null hypothesis can be rejected.   
*, ** represent significance levels at 1% and 5% respectively.   
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Table 5.20   3-Bank Concentration Ratios and Competition Index (1993-2000) 
 
 
Country CR3 H Statistic 
 The Czech Rep. 65.2 0.5171 
 Estonia 79.3 0.7018 
 Croatia 62.2 0.7419 
 Hungary 52.4 0.3629 
 Lithuania 89.1 0.4449 
 Latvia 55.1 0.7552 
 FYR of Macedonia 77.8 0.1809 
 Poland 52.2 0.5074 
 Romania 77.5 0.5381 
 The Russian Fed. 48.7 0.6449 
 Slovenia 62.5 0.576 
 Slovakia 72.2 0.0987 
 Yugoslavia 71.6 0.7055 
 Bulgaria 84 0.6076 
   
  116
 
 
Table 5.21 Derivation of  the Cost Frontier 
 
 
Cost efficiency scores measure the performance of a banking firm relative to the best-
practice bank that produces the same output bundle under the same exogenous 
conditions. The cost frontier is derived by estimating the following cost function: 
 
C =C (y,w,z,u,e)  
where,  C measures total costs for bank, including both operating and financial costs;  
y is a vector of outputs; w is a vector of input prices;  
z represents the quantities of fixed bank parameters (bank capital, fixed assets, off-
balance sheet items, etc.);   
u is the inefficiency term that captures the difference between the efficient level of cost 
for given output levels and input prices and the actual level of cost; and  
e is the random error term.  
 
Assuming the inefficiency and random error term are multiplicatively separable from the 
rest of the parameters, the cost function can be expressed in logarithmic form as: 
 
ln C= f(y,w,z) + ln u + ln e   
where f denotes a functional form. After estimating a particular cost function, the cost 
efficiency for bank i is measured as the ratio between the minimum cost (Cmin) necessary 
to produce that bank’s output and the actual cost (Ci): 
 
 
iii
i u
u
uxzwyf
uxzwyf
C
CCOSTEFF minminmin
)exp(ln)],,(exp[
)exp(ln)],,(exp[ ===    
where umin is the minimum ui across all banks in the sample.  
 
Under this formulation, an efficiency score, say 0.90, implies that the bank would have 
incurred 90 percent of its actual costs had it operated in the cost frontier.   
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Table 5.22 Derivation of the Alternative Profit Frontier 
 
 
Profit efficiency measures how close a bank is to attaining the maximum possible profit 
as a best-practice firm on the frontier for given levels of input and output prices 
(quantities) and other exogenous market variables. 
 
Previous literature offers two different specifications for the profit maximization 
objective, namely “standard” and “alternative” (non-standard) profit functions. The 
standard profit function assumes that output markets are perfectly competitive so that 
banks are price-takers in both output and input markets while alternative profit 
specification assumes that banks can have some power in determining output prices. 
Thus, standard profit function is specified as a function of input and output prices, 
whereas alternative profit function is specified as a function of input prices and output 
quantities.  
 
The alternative profit specification employs the same set of exogenous variables as the 
cost function in Table 5.21 with the only difference that profit replaces total cost as the 
dependant variable in the frontier regression. Therefore, the alternative profit frontier is 
given by  
 
P = P ( y,w,z u, e) 
 
where P is the variable profits of the firm, which includes all the interest and fee income 
earned less total costs, C, used in the cost function. The profit function can be written in 
log terms: 
 
ln (P+θ)  = f(y,w,z) + ln e - ln u 
 
where θ is a constant added to every bank’s profit to make it positive  so that the natural 
log can be taken. 
 
θ
θ
−
−==
)exp(ln)],,(exp[
)exp(ln)],,(exp[
maxmax uxzwyf
uxzwyf
P
PPROFEFF iii  
 
Profit efficiency is measured by the ratio between the actual profit of a bank and the 
maximum possible profit that is achievable by the most efficient bank.  
where umax is the maximum ui across all banks in the sample. For example, profit 
efficiency score of a bank, say, of 80% means that the bank is losing about 20% of its 
potential profits to managerial failure in choosing optimum input quantities and output 
prices. 
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Table 5.23  The Multi-product Translog Functional Form  
 
 
The multi-product translog functional form is employed to estimate the cost and alternative profit 
frontiers and derive the efficiency measures. The cost frontier function is represented by:  
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where wi and yi are input prices and output amounts and  z is the equity capital. The dependent 
variable, total cost, is the sum of interest expenses, personnel expenses and other operating 
expenses. I impose the regular restrictions of symmetry and linear homogeneity for input prices in 
estimating the parameters as the following: 
 
                kjβ = jkβ ,  lhω  = hlω  ;   ∑
=
3
1l
lα = 1,    ∑
=
3
1h
lhω = 0 ,   ∑
=
3
1l
lkδ = 0.   
   
In this study, banks are modeled as multi-product firms that produce 3 outputs (loans, 
investments, and deposits) and employ 3 inputs (borrowed funds, labor, and physical capital).  
The price of borrowed funds (W1) is estimated as interest expenses divided by customer and 
short term funding plus other funding. The price of labor (W2) is defined as the ratio of personnel 
expenses to total assets.  The price of physical capital (W3) is measured as the ratio of other 
operating expense to fixed assets. 
 
Cost and input prices are normalized by the price of capital before taking logarithms to impose 
linear input price homogeneity. Since I do not decompose the efficiency measure into technical 
and allocative components, the cost functions are not estimated using the input share equations.   
 
The alternative profit frontier estimation employs essentially the same specification in cost 
equation with some minor changes. For the profit frontier estimation the dependent variable  
ln (C / w3z) is replaced with ln (P/w3z) and the inefficiency term is -u. 
 
Cost, profit and output variables are normalized by equity capital (Z). This normalization controls 
for heteroscedasticity, scale biases, and other estimation biases in addition to providing a more 
economic meaning since the dependant variable in profit function essentially becomes ROE, a 
common measure of performance. 
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Table 5.24   Cost Efficiency Measures  
 
    
          Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) 
 
 
    Distribution Free Approach (DFA) 
                 
Country   SFA(0)  SFA(1)  SFA(5)  SFA(10)  DFA(0)  DFA(1)  DFA(5)  DFA(10) 
                 
Czech Republic 0.715  0.772  0.778  0.810  0.391  0.653  0.717  0.777 
Estonia  0.690  0.734  0.738  0.779  0.371  0.619  0.677  0.731 
Croatia  0.755  0.799  0.803  0.834  0.442  0.722  0.776  0.819 
Hungary  0.717  0.775  0.777  0.812  0.411  0.666  0.732  0.791 
Lithuania  0.591  0.695  0.702  0.755  0.345  0.575  0.633  0.692 
Latvia  0.651  0.716  0.728  0.774  0.376  0.627  0.691  0.747 
FYR Macedonia 0.741  0.781  0.787  0.820  0.424  0.707  0.776  0.838 
Poland  0.774  0.813  0.832  0.854  0.439  0.732  0.816  0.863 
Romania  0.725  0.777  0.776  0.800  0.411  0.686  0.750  0.805 
Russian Fed.  0.621  0.686  0.712  0.762  0.360  0.604  0.667  0.726 
Slovenia  0.738  0.792  0.813  0.857  0.456  0.762  0.803  0.842 
Slovakia  0.668  0.748  0.760  0.804  0.377  0.631  0.698  0.762 
Overall   0.700  0.758  0.767  0.804  0.398  0.663  0.727  0.781 
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Table 5.25   Profit Efficiency Measures 
 
    
       Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) 
 
 
       Distribution Free Approach (DFA) 
                 
Country   SFA(0)  SFA(1)  SFA(5)  SFA(10)   DFA(0)  DFA(1)  DFA(5)  DFA(10) 
                 
Czech Republic 0.633  0.665  0.685  0.705  0.322  0.413  0.422  0.526 
Estonia  0.619  0.659  0.696  0.708  0.338  0.379  0.437  0.535 
Croatia  0.539  0.589  0.640  0.655  0.291  0.441  0.568  0.691 
Hungary  0.427  0.497  0.570  0.587  0.262  0.426  0.556  0.670 
Lithuania  0.595  0.638  0.676  0.689  0.346  0.370  0.475  0.578 
Latvia  0.631  0.665  0.697  0.709  0.393  0.339  0.443  0.544 
FYR Macedonia 0.633  0.663  0.696  0.708  0.376  0.347  0.448  0.553 
Poland  0.550  0.599  0.654  0.663  0.306  0.423  0.545  0.665 
Romania  0.355  0.438  0.532  0.555  0.296  0.479  0.595  0.657 
Russian Fed.  0.460  0.524  0.592  0.606  0.267  0.537  0.561  0.602 
Slovenia  0.565  0.615  0.665  0.675  0.310  0.403  0.518  0.630 
Slovakia  0.627  0.659  0.682  0.700  0.368  0.348  0.449  0.550 
Overall   0.553  0.601  0.649  0.663  0.323  0.409  0.501  0.600 
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Table 5.26   Regression Analysis of Potential Correlates of Efficiency 
 
 
Variable  
 
  
Cost Efficiency 
 
Profit Efficiency 
     Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Intercept    0.83290 15.79* 0.8333 11.62 
COMP Degree of Competition by 
Panzar and Rosse H-
statistic 
 0.0395 2.12** -0.1308 -4.37* 
ICR3 Market share of largest 3 
banks in the industry 
 -0.00010 -0.43 -0.00261 -8.16* 
LNTA Logarithm of Total Assets  0.01010 4.31* 0.002345 0.74 
ROA Return on Average Assets  0.00149 3.08* 0.00154 4.34* 
EQTY Shareholder's Equity /Total 
Assets 
 0.10100 4.15* 0.0458 1.38 
LOANS Total Loans / total assets  0.04950 2.93* 0.0245 1.06 
LLR/TL Loan Loss Reserves/Gross 
Loans 
 -0.00237 -3.82* -0.00533 -6.33* 
CSTF Customer and ST 
funding/total funds 
 0.06090 2.09** -0.0265 -0.67 
IBDP Interbank Deposits/Total 
Deposits 
 -0.02450 -4.80* -0.0115 -1.66*** 
OBSI Off-balance sheet 
items/total assets 
 0.01100 1.70*** 0.0205 2.33** 
GDPGROW
TH 
Growth rate in state real 
domestic product 
 0.00366 5.16* -0.0117 -12.15* 
SPEC Dummy variable that 
equals 1 if bank is a 
commercial bank, 0 
otherwise 
 -0.06230 -4.90* 0.0164 0.95 
FOREIGN  Dummy variable that 
equals 1 if more than 50% 
of the bank assets are 
owned by foreign banks; 0 
otherwise  
 0.03130 3.96* -0.0669 -6.22* 
LISTED Dummy variable that 
equals 1 if bank is publicly 
traded, 0 otherwise 
 -0.00388 -0.44 0.008102 0.68 
Adjusted R2                        0.23 
*,**,*** represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
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